- From: Peter F. Patel-Schneider <pfps@research.bell-labs.com>
- Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2003 10:45:31 -0500 (EST)
- To: www-rdf-rules@w3.org
I have a number of comments on the draft rules WG charter, revision 1.26. I worry about the tieing together of rules and justifications. Justifications can be quite difficult to deal with, except under certain circumstances, even if limited to rule systems. In particular, checking whether the application of a non-monotonic rule is justified can be intractable or even undecidable. I also worry about the condition that justifications are only to be used to justify how rules were used to reach a conclusion. Even in an RDFS plus rules setting, there is more going on than just rule activity. If this is the case, how will the RDFS inferences be recorded? The situation is much more complex in an OWL plus rule setting. The document appears to me to be internally inconsistent, particularly with respect to jusifications. In Section 1 it states that justifications are to be used to ``allow the expression of of the knowledge of how certain rules were used to reach conclusion''. In Section 2.1 it states that the working group is supposed to address ``a language for the exchange of proofs'', which is a much more ambitious scope than recording rule traces. The document appears to require that rules be equivalent to material implications, which is not their treatment in many rule systems. In particular, in some rule formulations that allow disjunctive information rules with false consequents are not equivalent to classical negation. The document again brings up the desire to put everything in RDF, both syntactically and semantically. The Web Ontology Working Group spent a lot of time wrestling with a similar mandate before ultimately settling on a partial solution that only works because of several characteristics of OWL, which would not be shared by a rules language. I forsee that a similar mandate for rules would end up causing a similar delay for the rules working group. It is not the case that proof checking is ``computationally much easier than theorem proving''. In decidable logics the length of a proof may be similar to the number of computational steps required to proove a particular result. This may lead to a PSPACE deduction procedure but proof checking requiring exponential space just to store the proof. Peter F. Patel-Schneider Bell Labs Research
Received on Monday, 10 November 2003 10:45:46 UTC