- From: Brad Hill <hillbrad@gmail.com>
- Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2013 13:54:49 -0700
- To: Devdatta Akhawe <dev.akhawe@gmail.com>
- Cc: Daniel Veditz <dveditz@mozilla.com>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAEeYn8jwJau1vO6P72jUPF=Jr=OLJwNq9OQ5Jh4E63B98fPKog@mail.gmail.com>
Makes sense. On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 1:48 PM, Devdatta Akhawe <dev.akhawe@gmail.com>wrote: > Should we add filesystem: URIs to that list? I think there was a claimed > Chrome extensions' CSP bypass due to filesystem: URIs at this year's > AppSecEU: http://is.gd/mq1GLQ > > > -dev > > > On 3 September 2013 13:38, Brad Hill <hillbrad@gmail.com> wrote: > >> We had an action item for some time to clarify this, that we dropped. >> I'd propose something like the following: >> >> >> Inline-content >> -------------------- >> >> Certain URL schemes, including but not limited to javascript:, data: and >> blob:, and the srcdoc attribute of iframe, refer to content that is >> delivered inline with the body of another HTTP response, rather than a >> resource representation independently retrieved with an identifiable >> origin. Such schemes have special processing rules: >> >> 1) Schemes designating inline content are ignored if listed directly as >> a scheme-source, and are excluded from the "*" match rule. >> >> 1) For most directives, all resources designated by these schemes are >> considered equivalent to the 'self' origin, and allowed if 'self' is >> specified, either by keyword-source or by the host-source production >> matching the resource's own origin. >> >> 2) For the script-src directive, all resources designated by these >> schemes do not match unless the 'unsafe-eval' keyword-source is specified. >> >> >> I wonder if we need to consider similar for style-src? Is it 'self' or >> 'unsafe-inline'? >> >> -Brad Hill >> >> >> On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 11:05 AM, Daniel Veditz <dveditz@mozilla.com>wrote: >> >>> On 8/30/2013 2:05 PM, Brad Hill wrote: >>> > I started writing CSP tests for workers, and realized that the blob: >>> > scheme can be used to circumvent inline-script and eval protections. >>> You >>> > can grab text out of the DOM or any string, use createObjectURL() and >>> > run it as script, so long as 'self' is in the policy. >>> >>> Where we go wrong is in section 3.2.2.2 where matching rules allow "*" >>> to match all schemes. We'd be better off treating is as implied by the >>> syntax in 3.2.2: >>> >>> According to the syntax the "*" is part of the "host" production, which >>> has an optional scheme part. Elsewhere in the matching rules if the >>> scheme is not present then the scheme must match the document's scheme; >>> as an exception we also allow https: to match documents which have a >>> http: scheme. Currently if you specify * it will match ftp, gopher, aim, >>> file, and anything that might get invented after the page author >>> specifies their policy. >>> >>> -Dan Veditz >>> >>> >> >
Received on Tuesday, 3 September 2013 20:55:17 UTC