- From: Devdatta Akhawe <dev.akhawe@gmail.com>
- Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2013 13:48:13 -0700
- To: Brad Hill <hillbrad@gmail.com>
- Cc: Daniel Veditz <dveditz@mozilla.com>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAPfop_3sfzTyBQQS=HJKkor6ighmhFpScNKhYCnD9vHQ6kqfqw@mail.gmail.com>
Should we add filesystem: URIs to that list? I think there was a claimed Chrome extensions' CSP bypass due to filesystem: URIs at this year's AppSecEU: http://is.gd/mq1GLQ -dev On 3 September 2013 13:38, Brad Hill <hillbrad@gmail.com> wrote: > We had an action item for some time to clarify this, that we dropped. I'd > propose something like the following: > > > Inline-content > -------------------- > > Certain URL schemes, including but not limited to javascript:, data: and > blob:, and the srcdoc attribute of iframe, refer to content that is > delivered inline with the body of another HTTP response, rather than a > resource representation independently retrieved with an identifiable > origin. Such schemes have special processing rules: > > 1) Schemes designating inline content are ignored if listed directly as a > scheme-source, and are excluded from the "*" match rule. > > 1) For most directives, all resources designated by these schemes are > considered equivalent to the 'self' origin, and allowed if 'self' is > specified, either by keyword-source or by the host-source production > matching the resource's own origin. > > 2) For the script-src directive, all resources designated by these schemes > do not match unless the 'unsafe-eval' keyword-source is specified. > > > I wonder if we need to consider similar for style-src? Is it 'self' or > 'unsafe-inline'? > > -Brad Hill > > > On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 11:05 AM, Daniel Veditz <dveditz@mozilla.com>wrote: > >> On 8/30/2013 2:05 PM, Brad Hill wrote: >> > I started writing CSP tests for workers, and realized that the blob: >> > scheme can be used to circumvent inline-script and eval protections. You >> > can grab text out of the DOM or any string, use createObjectURL() and >> > run it as script, so long as 'self' is in the policy. >> >> Where we go wrong is in section 3.2.2.2 where matching rules allow "*" >> to match all schemes. We'd be better off treating is as implied by the >> syntax in 3.2.2: >> >> According to the syntax the "*" is part of the "host" production, which >> has an optional scheme part. Elsewhere in the matching rules if the >> scheme is not present then the scheme must match the document's scheme; >> as an exception we also allow https: to match documents which have a >> http: scheme. Currently if you specify * it will match ftp, gopher, aim, >> file, and anything that might get invented after the page author >> specifies their policy. >> >> -Dan Veditz >> >> >
Received on Tuesday, 3 September 2013 20:49:00 UTC