Re: [webappsec] CSP: are blob uri's really just origin='self'?

> I think there was a claimed
>> Chrome extensions' CSP bypass due to filesystem: URIs at this year's
>> AppSecEU: http://is.gd/mq1GLQ

This is true, I was at his talk. Krzysztof Kotowicz ( krzysztof@kotowicz.net ) is the real deal and I'm sure he would be willing to lend support if the video does not explain it in enough detail.

Aloha,
Jim


> Makes sense.
> 
> 
> On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 1:48 PM, Devdatta Akhawe <dev.akhawe@gmail.com>wrote:
> 
>> Should we add filesystem: URIs to that list? I think there was a claimed
>> Chrome extensions' CSP bypass due to filesystem: URIs at this year's
>> AppSecEU: http://is.gd/mq1GLQ
>>
>>
>> -dev
>>
>>
>> On 3 September 2013 13:38, Brad Hill <hillbrad@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> We had an action item for some time to clarify this, that we dropped.
>>>  I'd propose something like the following:
>>>
>>>
>>> Inline-content
>>> --------------------
>>>
>>> Certain URL schemes, including but not limited to javascript:, data: and
>>> blob:, and the srcdoc attribute of iframe, refer to content that is
>>> delivered inline with the body of another HTTP response, rather than a
>>> resource representation independently retrieved with an identifiable
>>> origin.  Such schemes have special processing rules:
>>>
>>> 1)  Schemes designating inline content are ignored if listed directly as
>>> a scheme-source, and are excluded from the "*" match rule.
>>>
>>> 1) For most directives, all resources designated by these schemes are
>>> considered equivalent to the 'self' origin, and allowed if 'self' is
>>> specified, either by keyword-source or by the host-source production
>>> matching the resource's own origin.
>>>
>>> 2) For the script-src directive, all resources designated by these
>>> schemes do not match unless the 'unsafe-eval' keyword-source is specified.
>>>
>>>
>>> I wonder if we need to consider similar for style-src?  Is it 'self' or
>>> 'unsafe-inline'?
>>>
>>> -Brad Hill
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 11:05 AM, Daniel Veditz <dveditz@mozilla.com>wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 8/30/2013 2:05 PM, Brad Hill wrote:
>>>>> I started writing CSP tests for workers, and realized that the blob:
>>>>> scheme can be used to circumvent inline-script and eval protections.
>>>> You
>>>>> can grab text out of the DOM or any string, use createObjectURL() and
>>>>> run it as script, so long as 'self' is in the policy.
>>>>
>>>> Where we go wrong is in section 3.2.2.2 where matching rules allow "*"
>>>> to match all schemes. We'd be better off treating is as implied by the
>>>> syntax in 3.2.2:
>>>>
>>>> According to the syntax the "*" is part of the "host" production, which
>>>> has an optional scheme part. Elsewhere in the matching rules if the
>>>> scheme is not present then the scheme must match the document's scheme;
>>>> as an exception we also allow https: to match documents which have a
>>>> http: scheme. Currently if you specify * it will match ftp, gopher, aim,
>>>> file, and anything that might get invented after the page author
>>>> specifies their policy.
>>>>
>>>> -Dan Veditz
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>

Received on Tuesday, 3 September 2013 21:19:41 UTC