- From: Manu Mukerji <manu16m@gmail.com>
- Date: Thu, 31 May 2012 16:07:47 -0700
- To: Heather West <heatherwest@google.com>
- Cc: "Aleecia M. McDonald" <aleecia@aleecia.com>, Shane Wiley <wileys@yahoo-inc.com>, Lauren Gelman <gelman@blurryedge.com>, "ifette@google.com" <ifette@google.com>, Justin Brookman <justin@cdt.org>, "public-tracking@w3.org" <public-tracking@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CANt+7cXkZJC6tDOT=EPGnzuLi8QvfhgpSjCd3daxhVS3pkWU6w@mail.gmail.com>
Wouldn't it make life easier to ask the browsers not to expose the ability to control the DNT setting from outside the browser. -Manu On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 3:59 PM, Heather West <heatherwest@google.com>wrote: > I think that these developments - and the resulting surprise from many - > make it pretty clear that we should take some time and outline what we > expect of user agents. I definitely think we should add a section for that. > > > On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 6:31 PM, Aleecia M. McDonald <aleecia@aleecia.com>wrote: > >> Some very quick points: >> >> - Until we have a published recommendation, there is nothing to comply >> with. >> - I see this as a reason to push for a recommendation sooner rather than >> later: this is the sort of thing that happens in the days before a >> recommendation, with companies interpreting and implementing as they like >> on all sides. >> >> I've had calmer days, how about all of you? >> >> On the call yesterday I suggested we add a new section on what user >> agents either must or should do to be in compliance with the spec. As >> written, there are currently no requirements on browsers. This seems like >> an area for further discussion. If a user agent claims to be compliant and >> is not, they have the FTC to answer to in the US. If a user agent is not >> compliant, they have press questions to answer. This is what I had in mind >> when we started the conversation yesterday. >> >> Of note: I did not know about MSFT's upcoming announcement prior to the >> call yesterday. >> >> Aleecia >> >> On May 31, 2012, at 2:25 PM, Shane Wiley wrote: >> >> This is an invalid use case as the draft compliance document already >> states a user must actively turn on DNT and this cannot be turned on by >> default. IE10 is already out of DNT compliance.**** >> ** ** >> - Shane**** >> ** ** >> *From:* Lauren Gelman [mailto:gelman@blurryedge.com] >> *Sent:* Thursday, May 31, 2012 2:21 PM >> *To:* ifette@google.com >> *Cc:* Shane Wiley; Justin Brookman; public-tracking@w3.org >> *Subject:* Re: tracking-ISSUE-150: DNT conflicts from multiple user >> agents [Tracking Definitions and Compliance]**** >> ** ** >> ** ** >> I just saw this, so in fairness I am revisiting Shane's question: **** >> >> http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/news/Press/2012/May12/05-31Windows8RPPR.aspx >> **** >> ** ** >> If a browser ships DNT:0 by default and a user turns it to DNT:1, then >> "informed, explicit" consent is needed for a publisher to cookie the user. >> **** >> ** ** >> If a browser ships DNT:1 by default, and a user turns it to DNT:0 then >> "informed, explicit" consent would be needed for a publisher to not collect >> cookies from the user.**** >> ** ** >> So it still seems to be a matter of requiring heightened awareness based >> on a PROCESS-- when someone who has changed their default setting is asked >> to override that default and not SUBSTANCE-- whether the change is turning >> on or off DNT.**** >> ** ** >> Lauren Gelman >> BlurryEdge Strategies >> 415-627-8512**** >> ** ** >> On May 30, 2012, at 9:31 PM, Ian Fette (イアンフェッティ) wrote:**** >> >> >> **** >> >> It's also to note that over time, things have tended to shift, e.g. some >> browsers are now blocking third party cookies by default...**** >> On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 4:44 PM, Lauren Gelman <gelman@blurryedge.com> >> wrote:**** >> ** ** >> Of course-- but realistically, majority default DNT is not the world this >> standard will exist in. DNT is going to be a 10% solution.**** >> ** ** >> Frankly, having done privacy for almost 20 years, the idea that millions >> of users are going to turn on any privacy setting such that they >> unknowingly stop sharing their data in a way that actually has any impact >> on any businesses bottom line is unrealistic at best. (Can anyone point to >> any internet business, ever, where this has happened??) I've heard of spam, >> spyware, fishing, spear fishing, etc. I've never heard of a massive >> pro-privacy viral campaign that worked. There's lots of $ behind >> companies trying to get users to turn off DNT and no $ to try to get them >> to turn it on, so I think this is really orthogonal to what this group is >> working on.**** >> ** ** >> Lauren Gelman >> BlurryEdge Strategies >> 415-627-8512**** >> ** ** >> On May 30, 2012, at 4:05 PM, Ian Fette (イアンフェッティ) wrote:**** >> >> >> **** >> I think the desire though is that DNT is a representation of a user's >> explicit preference. If a browser set it by default, for instance, would a >> site be obligated to respect it?**** >> ** ** >> >> -Ian**** >> On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:33 PM, Lauren Gelman <gelman@blurryedge.com> >> wrote:**** >> ** ** >> I don't see the parity here. One is a user's affirmative action being >> overruled by another entity. The other is the user opting to change a >> default setting. **** >> ** ** >> Lauren Gelman >> BlurryEdge Strategies >> 415-627-8512**** >> ** ** >> On May 30, 2012, at 3:22 PM, Shane Wiley wrote:**** >> >> >> **** >> Justin,**** >> **** >> If companies are expected to achieve “informed and explicit” consent to >> turn off DNT, then it is only fair that User Agents also achieve “informed >> and explicit” consent to turn on DNT. Do you disagree?**** >> **** >> - Shane**** >> **** >> *From:* Justin Brookman [mailto:justin@cdt.org] >> *Sent:* Wednesday, May 30, 2012 3:17 PM >> *To:* public-tracking@w3.org >> *Subject:* Re: tracking-ISSUE-150: DNT conflicts from multiple user >> agents [Tracking Definitions and Compliance]**** >> **** >> >> What problem? You honor the header by doing what the spec says. There >> is no need for you to try to discern user intent, and indeed, no way for >> you to do so. Ad networks cannot be and are not expected to be responsible >> for every UI or every possible bit of misinformation someone saw in a >> comment thread on Reddit to get them to turn on DNT in the first place. >> >> Today, if someone sets their browser to block third-party cookies, you >> don't try to circumvent that on the theory that someone maybe didn't >> understand what cookies did in the first place. Nor do we dictate to the >> user agents how and when to surface and describe those capabilities. >> >> If there are conflicting headers, that's a different issue, and Ian and >> Jonathan are putting together draft text on that issue.**** >> >> Justin Brookman**** >> >> Director, Consumer Privacy**** >> >> Center for Democracy & Technology**** >> >> 1634 I Street NW, Suite 1100**** >> >> Washington, DC 20006**** >> >> tel 202.407.8812**** >> >> fax 202.637.0969**** >> >> justin@cdt.org**** >> >> http://www.cdt.org**** >> >> @CenDemTech**** >> >> @JustinBrookman**** >> >> >> On 5/30/2012 3:34 PM, Chris Mejia wrote:**** >> I believe new Issue-150 is closely related to open Issue-143. If the >> user's intent in turning on/off DNT is not clear (especially in cases where >> the user doesn't even know they are specifically sending a DNT:1 header), >> there is no way for publishers to understand how to accurately "honor" any >> consumer's DNT header flag― *it's a fundamental flaw with this scope of >> this proceeding*. I laid out the concern in some detail in my previous >> email to the group ("In Support of Issue-143"); so I'll just give the brief >> version here: if publishers do not understand the context of the user's DNT >> expression (was the user properly informed about what setting does/means, >> before it was set) how are publishers to determine what the user actually >> intended, or if they user is even aware that a DNT flag is being sent? If >> any question/statement in any UI can lead to the sending of DNT:1 or DNT:0, >> where is the integrity of the system/solution? **** >> **** >> To give just one example (there are many) of how a DNT mechanism that >> lacks a uniform informed consent requirement might be abused, consider the >> theoretical yet plausible scenario where an email is sent to (millions of) >> users informing the users that they should "*click here to prevent evil >> doers from knowing who you are*" or even worse, "*click here if you >> think blue is a pretty color*" (replace with a variety of malware >> tactics), the user's click leading to a programatic setting of DNT, without >> the user's informed consent under uniform compliance rules. When that >> happens (some zealot decides to abuse the system), I'm sure we'll >> eventually learn about it, after some amount of damage being done. **** >> **** >> *When it becomes known that users were deceived into sending a DNT >> expression (no uniform informed consent), here's what the end-game of >> publishers might be: * without a way of discerning how DNT was set >> (which program; who owns the program; being able to inspect the program), >> and under which auspices it was set (what did the user agree to when they >> clicked?), when learning of a set of users who were deceived into setting >> DNT, publishers may be forced to consider if they should honor any DNT >> header requests at all, in an effort to protect the web experience of all >> users. Under this scenario, publishers may be compelled to issue public >> statements outlining the fatal flaws of this W3C DNT mechanism, citing the >> specific abuses, and walking away from compliance on the grounds that being >> "compliant" with such a system would be harmful to the majority of its >> users.**** >> **** >> Is that really the result that this working group is looking for? If >> not, I strongly suggest that we all get on board with defining a system >> where the actual intent of the user is absolutely clear― the only way I can >> think to accomplish this is to require compliance with a uniform >> requirement to properly educate/inform the user about their choice, at the >> point user choice is made. Of course I'm open to hearing other suggestions >> for solving this problem, but I feel that "*it's out of scope/Charter >> for this project*" is not an acceptable solution― that answer does not >> solve the problem described here and in open Issue-143. Please, let's >> solve the actual problem.**** >> **** >> Chris Mejia, IAB/DAA**** >> **** >> **** >> On 5/30/12 1:35 PM, "Tracking Protection Working Group Issue Tracker" < >> sysbot+tracker@w3.org> wrote:**** >> **** >> >> tracking-ISSUE-150: DNT conflicts from multiple user agents [Tracking >> Definitions and Compliance]**** >> **** >> http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/track/issues/150**** >> **** >> Raised by: Aleecia McDonald**** >> On product: Tracking Definitions and Compliance**** >> **** >> Due to multiple addons that support Do Not Track, there could be >> conflicts. For example, a user could turn off DNT (not unset, actually off, >> sending DNT:0) in Firefox, yet install Abine's "Do Not Track Plus" addon >> (which sends DNT:1). More fun, users could have three different addons, >> each with a different value. Do we have either best practices or >> requirements for user agents here?**** >> **** >> Created from original issue-148, with actions taken by ifette and jmayer >> to write proposals.**** >> **** >> **** >> **** >> **** >> >> ** ** >> ** ** >> ** ** >> ** ** >> ** ** >> >> >> > > > -- > > Heather West | Google Policy | heatherwest@google.com | 202-643-6381 >
Received on Friday, 1 June 2012 09:23:29 UTC