W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-tracking@w3.org > July 2012

Re: ISSUE-4 and clarity regarding browser defaults

From: Joseph Lorenzo Hall <joehall@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Jul 2012 15:39:41 -0400
Message-ID: <CACDmtYbCVTA0K==_cHSCozQbo2eP_2Xn=ZpAwmQX4jHXKGB2aQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Chris Pedigo <CPedigo@online-publishers.org>
Cc: "public-tracking@w3.org" <public-tracking@w3.org>
On Fri, Jul 27, 2012 at 12:32 PM, Chris Pedigo
<CPedigo@online-publishers.org> wrote:
> "The same cannot be said about a DNT-1 signal that looks 100% valid, but is being rejected based on the fact some ad networks have decided the UA-side settings are not up to par."
> I agree that parties shouldn't be able to make up reasons to reject the DNT:1 signal and still claim compliance.  In this case, however, I think we're talking about servers rejecting a signal from a UA that is clearly not compliant with the standard. Nothing is made up here. It's very clear.  In this case, I believe we should have flexibility to honor or not. Binding industry to acknowledge invalid UAs seems to be a dangerous path to go down.

What I think about here is something I do regularly: spoofing my
browser's UA string. So, if I have DNT:1 set and am spoofing my UA
string (so I'm using a DNT-compliant UA that just appears to be a
non-compliant UA), it would seem that the DNT setting would likely not
be honored, despite my intent. I can imagine there are other ways to
"detect" UAs, but "spoofing" may evolve to mimic those distinguishing
properties too (for example, for testing web design).

best, Joe

Joseph Lorenzo Hall
Postdoctoral Research Fellow
Media, Culture and Communication
New York University
Received on Friday, 27 July 2012 19:40:49 UTC

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