W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-tracking@w3.org > July 2012

Re: ISSUE-4 and clarity regarding browser defaults

From: Joseph Lorenzo Hall <joehall@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Jul 2012 15:39:41 -0400
Message-ID: <CACDmtYbCVTA0K==_cHSCozQbo2eP_2Xn=ZpAwmQX4jHXKGB2aQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Chris Pedigo <CPedigo@online-publishers.org>
Cc: "public-tracking@w3.org" <public-tracking@w3.org>
On Fri, Jul 27, 2012 at 12:32 PM, Chris Pedigo
<CPedigo@online-publishers.org> wrote:
> "The same cannot be said about a DNT-1 signal that looks 100% valid, but is being rejected based on the fact some ad networks have decided the UA-side settings are not up to par."
>
> I agree that parties shouldn't be able to make up reasons to reject the DNT:1 signal and still claim compliance.  In this case, however, I think we're talking about servers rejecting a signal from a UA that is clearly not compliant with the standard. Nothing is made up here. It's very clear.  In this case, I believe we should have flexibility to honor or not. Binding industry to acknowledge invalid UAs seems to be a dangerous path to go down.

What I think about here is something I do regularly: spoofing my
browser's UA string. So, if I have DNT:1 set and am spoofing my UA
string (so I'm using a DNT-compliant UA that just appears to be a
non-compliant UA), it would seem that the DNT setting would likely not
be honored, despite my intent. I can imagine there are other ways to
"detect" UAs, but "spoofing" may evolve to mimic those distinguishing
properties too (for example, for testing web design).

best, Joe

-- 
Joseph Lorenzo Hall
Postdoctoral Research Fellow
Media, Culture and Communication
New York University
https://josephhall.org/
Received on Friday, 27 July 2012 19:40:49 UTC

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