- From: Haakon Bratsberg <haakon.bratsberg@opera.com>
- Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2012 22:47:21 +0100
- To: Jonathan Mayer <jmayer@stanford.edu>
- Cc: Rigo Wenning <rigo@w3.org>, public-tracking@w3.org, David Singer <singer@apple.com>
On Jan 9, 2012, at 9:58 PM, Jonathan Mayer wrote: > With the caveat that I'm certainly no expert on EU data protection law: I believe David's text may go a bit further than the "data processor" limitations by requiring a greater set of legal and technical precautions. That's possible. Nevertheless, they are along the same lines and I think it is i a good starting point to frame the outsourcing exception. That said, I'm a bit skeptical about trying to align this work _too_ much with both US, Canadian and EU privacy laws. DNT must make sense in relating to applicable laws = the DNT signal and compliance to it must in a meaningful way address the raised privacy concerns while being based on how the web actual works. Haakon > > Jonathan > > On Jan 9, 2012, at 12:14 PM, Haakon Bratsberg wrote: > >> >> On Jan 9, 2012, at 5:59 PM, Rigo Wenning wrote: >> >>> David, >>> >>> I like your suggestion. We should ask Rob about it as I think the restrictions >>> even match the definition of a data processor under the EU Directive, thus >>> giving the entire responsibility to the first party (data controller in EU >>> talk) >> >> I agree that the restrictions is close the definition of "processor" in EU privacy law. >> >> Directive 95/46/EC Section 2 e) of the reads: >> >>> 'processor' shall mean a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any >>> other body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller;" >> >> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML> >> >> David's text reflects the limitations on the processor's ability to process the data that follows from EU privacy law. >> >> Haakon >> >> >>> >>> Can we resolve? >>> >>> Rigo >>> >>> On Tuesday 03 January 2012 15:18:30 David Singer wrote: >>>> Issue number: 23 >>>> >>>> Issue name: Possible exemption for analytics >>>> Suggested retitle: Possible exemption for outsourcing >>>> >>>> Issue URL: >>>> http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/track/issues/23 >>>> >>>> Section number in the FPWD: 3.4 Types of Tracking >>>> Contributors to this text: (Draft) David Singer, (Edit) Jonathan Mayer >>>> >>>> Specification: >>>> A third-party site may operate as a first-party site if all the following >>>> conditions hold: the data collection, retention, and use, complies with at >>>> least the requirements for first-parties; the data collected is available >>>> only to the first party, and the third party has no independent right to >>>> use the data; the third party makes commitments to adhere to this standard >>>> in a form that is legally enforceable (directly or indirectly) by the first >>>> party, individual users, and regulators; data retention by the third party >>>> must not survive the end of this legal enforceability; the third party >>>> undertakes reasonable technical precautions to prevent collecting data that >>>> could be correlated across first parties. >>>> >>>> Non-normative Discussion: >>>> The rationale for rule (2) is that we allow the third party to stand in the >>>> first party’s shoes – but go no further. The third party may not use the >>>> data it collects for “product improvement,” “aggregate analytics,” or any >>>> other purpose except to fulfill a request by a first party, where the >>>> results are shared only with the first party. >>>> >>>> Rule (3) allows for the possibility of more than one level of outsourcing. >>>> >>>> In rule (4), one component of reasonable technical precautions will often be >>>> using the same-origin policy to segregate information for each first-party >>>> customer. >>>> >>>> Note that any data collected by the third party that is used, or may be >>>> used, in any way by any party other than the first party, is subject to the >>>> requirements for third parties. >>>> >>>> Example: >>>> ExampleAnalytics collects analytic data for ExampleProducts Inc.. It >>>> operates a site under the DNS analytics.exampleproducts.com. It collects >>>> and analyzes data on visits to ExampleProducts, and provides that data >>>> solely to ExampleProducts, and does not access or use it itself. >>>> >>>> Text that possibly belongs in other sections: >>>> When the third party sends a response header, that header must indicate that >>>> that they are a third party and that they are operating under this >>>> exception. Note that a third party that operates under a domain name or >>>> other arrangement that makes it appear to the user as if they are the first >>>> party, or a part or affiliate of the first party, is nonetheless a third >>>> party and is subject to the requirements of this clause ("DNS >>>> masquerading"). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Issue number: 34 >>>> Issue name: Possible exemption for aggregate analytics >>>> Suggested retitle: Possible exemption for unidentifiable data >>>> >>>> Issue URL: >>>> http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/track/issues/34 >>>> >>>> Section number in the FPWD: 3.4 Types of Tracking >>>> Contributors to this text: (Draft) David Singer, (Edit) Jonathan Mayer >>>> >>>> Specification: >>>> A third party may collect, retain, and use any information from a user or >>>> user agent that, with high probability, could not be used to: 1) identify >>>> or nearly identify a user or user agent; or >>>> 2) correlate the activities of a user or user agent across multiple network >>>> interactions. >>>> >>>> Examples: >>>> 1. A third-party advertising network records the fact that it displayed an >>>> ad. 2. A third-party analytics service counts the number of times a popular >>>> page was loaded. >>>> >>>> Non-Normative Discussion: >>>> This exception (like all exceptions) may not be combined with other >>>> exceptions unless specifically allowed. A third party acting within the >>>> outsourcing exception, for example, may not make independent use of the >>>> data it has collected even though the use involves unidentifiable data. A >>>> rule to the contrary would provide a perverse incentive for third parties >>>> to press all exceptions to the limit and then use the collected data within >>>> this exception. A potential ‘safe harbor’ under this clause could be to >>>> retain only aggregate counts, not per-transaction records. >>>> >>>> Text that possibly belongs elsewhere: >>>> Possible advances in de-anonymization that make previously non-identifiable >>>> data, identifiable, should be considered. [Maybe need an issue: whose >>>> problem is it when data from disparate sources, all but one of which are >>>> anonymous, is combined to achieve de-anonymization?] >> >> >
Received on Monday, 9 January 2012 21:48:02 UTC