Re: Who Watches the Watchmen? A Review of Subjective Approaches for Sybil-resistance in Proof of Personhood Protocols

On Thu, Sep 10, 2020, 1:03 AM email@yancy.lol <email@yancy.lol> wrote:

> I agree that a one-person-per-vote system is ideal, however it's hard map
> such a system to cyber space directly without a central authority.



It's hard, but that's what we're doing. Instead of trusting a central
authority, users should trust an anti-sybil algorithm they can verify
themselves.


Consider how one-vote-per-cpu can allow a way to directly prove the number
> of identities (cpus).  For example we know some entity is 10 cpus because
> they solve x of the last y blocks.  There is no need to trust any
> authority, only the  solution.
>
> I think Git system might be the closest to one-person-per-vote where you
> can know about how many people contribute to the longest known chain of
> commits of a git repo (the trunk branch) aka the current consensus.  Of
> course this doesn't map directly for a number of reasons (people are not
> simple cpus for one).
>
> -Yancy
>
> On Wednesday, September 09, 2020 19:09 CEST, Adam Stallard <
> adam.stallard@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> Verifiable credentials can certainly help. At BrightID, we're working on
> way for a decentralized group of computer nodes that analyze an anonymous
> social graph and make determinations about uniqueness to collaborate to
> sign a credential for a user.
>
> These credentials also have a notion of "context" to avoid unwanted
> linkage between a user as they participate in various apps and networks. A
> user of app A should be able to prove they're using only one account there
> without linking that account to an account in app B.
>
> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020, 3:55 AM Melvin Carvalho <melvincarvalho@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> I think this was the important insight of the paper here.  And I wonder
>> if it can be solved with verifiable credentials?
>>
>> "If blockchains are to become a significant public infrastructure,
>> particularly in the space of civic engagement, then Proof of Work's
>> “one-CPU-one-vote” or Proof of Stake's “one-dollar-one-vote” systems will
>> not suffice: in order to enable democratic governance, protocols that
>> signal unique human identities to enable "one-person-one-vote" systems must
>> be created."
>>
>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 12:50, Melvin Carvalho <melvincarvalho@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> PDF is here: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2008..05300.pdf
>>>
>>> Keywords: decentralized identity, Sybil-protection, crypto-governance
>>>
>>> Abstract.
>>>
>>> Most self-sovereign identity systems consist of strictly objective
>>> claims, cryptographically signed by trusted third party attestors. Lacking
>>> protocols in place to account for subjectivity, these systems do not form
>>> new sources of legitimacy that can address the central question concerning
>>> identity authentication: "Who verifies the verifier?". Instead, the
>>> legitimacy of claims is derived from traditional centralized institutions
>>> such as national ID issuers and KYC providers. Thisarchitecture has been
>>> employed, in part, to safeguard protocols from a vulnerability previously
>>> thought to be impossible to address in peer-to-peer systems: the Sybil
>>> attack, which refers to the abuse of an online system by creating many
>>> illegitimate virtual personas. Inspired by the progress in cryptocurrencies
>>> and blockchain technology, there has recently been a surge in networked
>>> protocols that make use of subjective inputs such as voting, vouching,and
>>> interpreting, to arrive at a decentralized and sybil-resistant consensus
>>> for identity. In this review, we will outline the approaches of these new
>>> and natively digital sources of authentication - their attributes,
>>> methodologies strengths, and weaknesses - and sketch out possible
>>> directions for future developments.
>>>
>>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 03:21, Wayne Chang <wyc@fastmail.fm> wrote:
>>>
>>>> link: https://arxiv.org/abs/2008.05300
>>>>
>>>> discussion from strangers on the internet:
>>>> https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=24411076
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>
>
>