- From: Dragana Damjanovic <dragana.damjano@gmail.com>
- Date: Mon, 22 May 2023 13:57:34 +0200
- To: ietf-http-wg@w3.org
- Message-ID: <CAG0m4gSF+j-apcVa4X5uHuz880stPp3UKb=CswVqw248Ac4kTQ@mail.gmail.com>
Hi, I am answering multiple emails in one email. I do not have a scenario where masking causes noticeable performance issues. I was trying to figure out if it is possible to remove it if a server wants to remove it. From the discussion, I hear that requiring TLS on the client side may be enough? Dragana On Sun, May 21, 2023 at 12:54 PM Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote: > On Sat, May 20, 2023, at 19:47, Ilari Liusvaara wrote: > > TLS will prevent the kind of middleboxes that were the motivation to > > adding masking to websockets. > > Not necessarily: those middleboxes were so terrible they would probably be > vulnerable to an attack that mutated the ciphertext so that looked like > cleartext HTTP. See also the NAT slipstreaming attacks. But also maybe > not: they are probably not so widely deployed any more[*]. It has, after > all, been some time. > > [*] I considered the possibility that they might not look at ports other > than 80, but you can run TLS on port 80. > > It's only time then that might change our attitude toward masking. We > might reasonably conclude that middleboxes that are that awful are no > longer worth protecting. By extension, however, that means concluding that > the endpoints, for whom those middleboxes might have caused problems, are > less reliant on those middleboxes. Remember that the attack was ultimately > on endpoints that were being served up malicious content by those > middleboxes. But there is a lot less content around that is unsecured now, > so maybe it's OK. > > FWIW, we deliberately shipped QUIC without equivalent protection against > this particular class of attack. It's harder to attack QUIC, but not > impossible. > > > And the kind of attacks discussed will not work through TLS > > terminating middlebox, and even if any attack worked, it would seem > > to be exploitable already. > > Yeah, I think that the requirement for TLS more or less rules out these > sorts of tricks for protecting endpoints. Endpoints need to protect > themselves (and a TLS terminator is an endpoint as far as something like > masking is concerned.) > >
Received on Monday, 22 May 2023 11:57:51 UTC