W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > ietf-http-wg@w3.org > April to June 2012

Re: multiplexing -- don't do it

From: Adrien W. de Croy <adrien@qbik.com>
Date: Mon, 02 Apr 2012 21:08:07 +0000
To: "Mike Belshe" <mike@belshe.com>
Cc: "Amos Jeffries" <squid3@treenet.co.nz>, "ietf-http-wg@w3.org" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
Message-Id: <eme80534ef-e486-490b-8e27-a263640988ef@boist>

------ Original Message ------
From: "Mike Belshe" <mike@belshe.com>
To: "Adrien W. de Croy" <adrien@qbik.com>
Cc: "Amos Jeffries" <squid3@treenet.co.nz>;"ietf-http-wg@w3.org" 
Sent: 3/04/2012 8:52:22 a.m.
Subject: Re: multiplexing -- don't do it
>On Mon, Apr 2, 2012 at 1:43 PM, Adrien W. de Croy <adrien@qbik.com> wrote:
> ------ Original Message ------
> From: "Mike Belshe" mike@belshe.com
> >
> >
> >On Mon, Apr 2, 2012 at 6:57 AM, Amos Jeffries <squid3@treenet.co.nz> wrote:
> > On 1/04/2012 5:17 a.m., Adam Barth wrote:  
> >  On Sat, Mar 31, 2012 at 4:54 AM, Mark Nottingham wrote:
> >   On 31/03/2012, at 1:11 PM, Mike Belshe wrote:
> >   
> >    For the record - nobody wants to avoid using port 80 for new 
> >    protocols.  I'd love to!  There is no religious reason that we 
> >    don't - its just that we know, for a fact, that we can't do it 
> >    without subjecting a non-trivial number of users to hangs, data 
> >    corruption, and other errors.  You might think its ok for 
> >    someone else's browser to throw reliability out the window, but 
> >    nobody at Microsoft, Google, or Mozilla has been willing to do 
> >    that…
 >    Mike -
 >    I don't disagree on any specific point (as I think you know), but 
 >    I would observe that the errors you're talking about can 
 >    themselves be viewed as transient. I.e., just because they occur 
 >    in experiments now, doesn't necessarily mean that they won't be 
 >    fixed in the infrastructure in the future -- especially if they 
 >    generate a lot of support calls, because they break a lot MORE 
 >    things than they do now.
 >    Yes, there will be a period of pain, but I just wanted to 
 >    highlight one of the potential differences between deploying a 
 >    standard and a single-vendor effort.  It's true that we can't go 
 >    too far here; if we specify a protocol that breaks horribly 50% 
 >    of the time, it won't get traction. However, if we have a good 
 >    base population and perhaps a good fallback story, we *can* 
 >    change things.
>    That's not our experience as browser vendors.  If browsers offer an
>    HTTP/2.0 that has a bad user experience for 10% of users, then 
>    major
>    sites (e.g., Twitter) won't adopt it.  They don't want to punish 
>    their
>    users any more than we do.
>    Worse, if they do adopt the new protocol, users who have trouble 
>    will
>    try another browser (e.g., one that doesn't support HTTP/2.0 such 
>    as
>    IE 9), observe that it works, and blame the first browser for being
>    buggy.  The net result is that we lose a user and no pressure is
>    exerted on the intermediaries who are causing the problem in the 
>    first
>    place.
>    These are powerful market force that can't really be ignored.
    So the takeway there is pay attention to the intermediary people 
    when they say something cant be implemented (or won't scale 
   I agree we should pay attention to scalability - and we have.
   Please don't disregard that Google servers switched to SPDY with 
   zero additional hardware (the google servers are fully conformant 
   http/1.1 proxies with a lot more DoS logic than the average site).  
   I know, some people think Google is some magical place where 
   scalability defies physics and is not relevant, but this isn't true. 
    Google is just like every other site, except much much bigger.   If 
   we had a 10% increase in server load with SPDY, Google never could 
   have shipped it.  Seriously, who would roll out thousands of new 
   machines for an experimental protocol?  Nobody.  How would we have 
   convinced the executive team "this will be faster", if they were 
   faced with some huge cap-ex bill?  Doesn't sound very convincing, 
   does it?  In my mind, we have already proven clearly that SPDY 
   scales just fine.
   But I'm open to other data.  So if you have a SPDY implementation 
   and want to comment on the effects on your server, lets hear it!   
   And I'm not saying SPDY is free.  But, when you weigh costs (like 
   compression and framing) against benefits (like 6x fewer 
   connections),  there is no problem.  And could we make improvements 
   still?  Of course.  But don't pretend that these are the critical 
   parts of SPDY.  These are the mice nuts.
  For a forward proxy, there are several main reasons to even exist:
  a) implement and enforce access control policy
  b) audit usage
  c) cache
  you block any of these by bypassing everything with TLS, you have a 
  non-starter for corporate environments.  Even if currently admins 
  kinda turn a blind eye (because they have to) and allow port 443 
  through, as more and more traffic moves over to 443, more pressure 
  will come down from management to control it.
  Best we don't get left with the only option being MITM.
 In my talk at the IETF, I proposed a solution to this.
 Browsers need to implement SSL to trusted proxies, which can do all of 
 the a/b/c that you suggested above.  This solution is better because 
 the proxy becomes explicit rather than implicit.  This means that the 
 user knows of it, and it IT guys knows of it.  If there are problems, 
 it can be configured out of the system.  Implicit proxies are only 
 known the the IT guy (maybe), and can't be configured out from a 
 client.  The browser can be made to honor HSTS so that end-to-end 
 encryption is always enforced appropriately.
 Further, proxies today already need this solution, even without SPDY.  
 Traffic is moving to SSL already, albeit slowly, and corporate 
 firewalls can't see it today.  Corporate firewall admins are forced to 
 do things like block facebook entirely to prevent data leakage.  But, 
 with this solution, they could allow facebook access and still protect 
 their IP.  (Or they could block it if they wanted to, of course).
 Anyway, I do agree with you that we need better solutions so that we 
 don't incur more SSL MITM.  Many corporations are already looking for 
 expensive SSL MITM solutions (very complex to rollout due to key 
 management) because of the reasons I mention above, and its a 
 technically inferior solution.
 So lets do it!
I basically agree with all the above, however there is the ISP 
intercepting proxy to think about.
Many ISPs here in NZ have them, it's just a fact of life when you're 
150ms from the US and restricted bandwidth.  Pretty much all the big 
ISPs have intercepting caching proxies.
There's just no way to make these work... period...
unless the ISP is to
a) try and support all their customers to use an explicit proxy, or
b) get all their customers to install a root cert so they can do MITM.
Maybe we need a better way to force a client to use a proxy, and take 
the pain out of it for administration.  And do it securely (just 
remembering why 305 was deprecated).

> Adrien
> >
> >Mike
> >
> > 
> > With plenty of bias, I agree.
> > 
> > AYJ
> > 
Received on Monday, 2 April 2012 21:08:36 UTC

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.4.0 : Friday, 17 January 2020 17:13:59 UTC