W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > www-tag@w3.org > February 2010

RE: ACTION-278 Hiding metadata for security reasons

From: Larry Masinter <masinter@adobe.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 15:05:47 -0800
To: Tyler Close <tyler.close@gmail.com>, Dan Connolly <connolly@w3.org>
CC: Tim Berners-Lee <timbl@w3.org>, John Kemp <john@jkemp.net>, "ashok.malhotra@oracle.com" <ashok.malhotra@oracle.com>, Jonathan Rees <jar@creativecommons.org>, "www-tag@w3.org" <www-tag@w3.org>, "Mark S. Miller" <erights@google.com>
Message-ID: <C68CB012D9182D408CED7B884F441D4D87C30B@nambxv01a.corp.adobe.com>
>   A user-agent
> MUST NOT disclose representations or URIs, unless either explicitly
> instructed to do so by the user or as legitimately directed to by
> presented content. Since the user may wish to keep this information
> confidential, the user-agent must not assume it can be revealed to
> third-parties.

While I'm sympathetic to the intent, this leaves undefined
 the scope of "user agent" here, referent of "the user", 
and the meanings of "disclose", "legitimately", "confidential",
"assume" and "third-parties".  Does "user agent" apply to,
say, archive.org (which might pick up a mailing list archive
of an email and scan what is supposed to be a 'private'
URL)? Does it apply to, say, news.google.com, which seems
to aggregate news from newspapers that have a "news reader"
registration and login requirements?

I don't think this is an effective path to pursue. There are
agents that use URIs, including browsers, crawlers, scanners, 
aggregators, portals, bookmark sharing tools, translation
gateways, Internet Archive services. These agents, for better
or worse, have widely varying properties where information
retrieved by them is distributed further, including using
Referer, publishing access logs, peer sharing of cached 
retrieved results, etc.  Many of those deployed web agents
make the presumption that any material they access without
going through any particular access control mechanism may
be shared further without particular restriction, although
in practice the distribution that happens is not widespread,
there are no guarantees.

While "secret URLs" provide the appearance of adding some
amount of confidentiality to the results, in fact, there
are many circumstances where such URLs are disclosed,
by agents that are not browsers and whose update to follow
recommendations in _this_ document is unlikely.

A false sense of security is worse than no security,
in many circumstances. 

If users wish to make material available to "anyone who
has the URL", that's fine, but don't make any promises
that this is a "security" mechanism, because it's not.

There is a kind of "security" I've heard called "yellow
ribbon security", which functions like the "yellow ribbon"
banner sometimes put up:


Now, the yellow ribbon doesn't actually prevent anyone
from crossing it, it just puts the crosser on notice
that they are actually crossing a line someone (perhaps
even the police) do not want them to cross.

It *might* be possible to make secret URLs into a 
"yellow ribbon" security mechanism, if, for example,
the "unguessable" part of the URL were clearly 
unguessable.  (Random jumble of letters rather than,
say, random quotes from literature, which might not
look random.)

Received on Wednesday, 10 February 2010 23:07:34 UTC

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