- From: David Wragg <DavidWragg@oilspace.com>
- Date: 30 Sep 2001 21:33:36 +0000
- To: www-patentpolicy-comment@w3.org
While I approve of the move to refine the W3C patent policy, I strongly disapprove of the actual refinements proposed in the working draft. Specifically, I reject the RAND licensing mode for W3C working groups. My proposed amendment to the working draft is simple: Section 5 should only allow working groups the option of the RF licensing mode. Refences to the RAND licensing mode throughout the document should be removed appropriately. The basis for my rejection of RAND licensing is simple: RAND ("reasonable, non-discriminatory terms") is an oxymoron, since any licensing terms other than RF are intrinsically discriminatory. The groups discriminated against are those who distribute their work freely, and so have no need or ability to track the distribution of their work. Consequently, they also have no ability to recoup patent license fees. Such groups are free software (sometimes known as open-source software) developers, and academic researchers. It is no coincidence that these groups have developed software that has figured prominently in the development of the World Wide Web. Other public comments have given other ways in which RAND licensing terms are discriminatory; for example, the use of W3C standards in very low cost devices, such as devices aimed at the non-western world. But the preceding paragraph describes my immediate concern. I would like to make some comments related to Section 2 ("Background"). Though it is only informative, it sets the tone of the working draft. The working draft seems to assume that software patents are inevitable, and that fee-based access to those patents is also inevitable. Thus it concludes that W3C standards will inevitably become encumbered by software patents with license fee requirements, and seeks to ensure that these requirements are applied in an even handed manner. I contend that those assumptions run counter to the spirit of cooperative development that led to the World Wide Web, and so the conclusions, as embodied in the normative sections of the working draft, are also flawed. Perhaps that most telling section of the working draft is Section 2.1: I agree with the observations in that section, but completely disagree with the conclusions. For point 1: as the Web comes into contact with the industries mentioned, the unencumbered nature of Web standards should be carried over to those industries. For point 2: This merely points to deficiencies of the U.S. PTO, and I give my full support to the efforts to make sure that the European patent office does not share those deficiencies. For point 3: The barriers mentioned are essential to prevent the domination of the internet and World Wide Web by the proprietary interests of a small number of large corporations. For point 4: Such patents are absurd, and the W3C ought to distance itself from them. If the W3C allows its standards to become encumbered by RAND licensing terms, the W3C will become irrelevant. Either because the World Wide Web will become dominated by the proprietary interests of a small number of large corporations, which will have little interest in the W3C in its current form once they have established their control (perhaps aided by RAND licensing). Or becuse the standards of the W3C that are so encumbered will be rejected, and future standards developed by the W3C will be viewed with suspicion, with other bodies taking on the role of developing unencumbered standards for the World Wide Web. David Wragg
Received on Sunday, 30 September 2001 17:34:19 UTC