- From: Kevin Regan <kevinr@valicert.com>
- Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2000 16:26:33 -0700
- To: tgindin@us.ibm.com, Kevin Regan <kevinr@valicert.com>
- Cc: Brian LaMacchia <bal@microsoft.com>, "'Yoshiaki KAWATSURA'" <kawatura@bisd.hitachi.co.jp>, w3c-ietf-xmldsig@w3.org
- Message-id: <27FF4FAEA8CDD211B97E00902745CBE2015B868C@seine.valicert.com>
I do see your point that different chains could share the same certificate. In this event, having to duplicate the information might not be ideal... --Kevin -----Original Message----- From: tgindin@us.ibm.com [mailto:tgindin@us.ibm.com] Sent: Tuesday, July 11, 2000 4:04 PM To: Kevin Regan Cc: Brian LaMacchia; 'Yoshiaki KAWATSURA'; w3c-ietf-xmldsig@w3.org Subject: RE: Questions/Comments for the current draft. It might well make sense, and it would surely be convenient for validation software, but is it really necessary? After all, by matching issuer names with subject names and AKI extensions with SKI ones (or performing a signature verification if the KI extensions are missing), one can tell for any two certificates in the set whether one was the issuer of the other or not, and thus construct the intended set of chains, especially since we know which were the actual signing certificates. The resulting structure could have some loops at higher levels, which might be considered sufficient reason for such a change. The simplest loop would have 2 EE certificates from different issuers but with the same key, and with the issuers of these certificates mutually cross-certifying. Even with only one EE certificate, a similar loop can be constructed if the issuer of that certificate had CA certificates issued by two higher-level CA's which were mutually cross-certifying. Tom Gindin Kevin Regan <kevinr@valicert.com> on 07/11/2000 06:26:07 PM To: Tom Gindin/Watson/IBM@IBMUS, Brian LaMacchia <bal@microsoft.com> cc: "'Yoshiaki KAWATSURA'" <kawatura@bisd.hitachi.co.jp>, w3c-ietf-xmldsig@w3.org Subject: RE: Questions/Comments for the current draft. Hi, Would it make sense to somehow delineate different chains within the KeyInfo element? Rather than just having a hodgepodge of certificate entries, would it be possible to group them in something like a <X509CertificateChain> element (in the correct order)? As a user (and implementer) of XML Signatures, it would be great to have a well-defined way of representing the certificates/keys/certificate chains that I would use to authenticate the signature. The KeyInfo field is very flexible, but maybe a little less flexibility would go a long way here... :-) Sincerely, Kevin Regan kevinr@valicert.com -----Original Message----- From: tgindin@us.ibm.com [mailto:tgindin@us.ibm.com] Sent: Tuesday, July 11, 2000 3:19 PM To: Brian LaMacchia Cc: 'Yoshiaki KAWATSURA'; w3c-ietf-xmldsig@w3.org Subject: RE: Questions/Comments for the current draft. Well, your intent is now clear. Since this is a reasonable position, I propose that a minor edit be made to section 4.4.4 to make it clear. Before the sentence in 4.4.4 which begins "for example", we should add the following sentence: A certificate is related to the signing key if it is either a certificate for that key (normally an end entity certificate) or a CA certificate in a certificate chain for one of the certificates for that key, and multiple certificates (either EE or CA certificates) for a specific key are permitted in a single KeyInfo element. Further comments below. Tom Gindin (snip)
Received on Tuesday, 11 July 2000 19:34:27 UTC