Re: FOAF-site cryptographic integrity / redundancy

> I don't know if you are a rape survivor (I hope not, of course), but  
> the survivors I know would be offended at best by this analogy.

so it seems the FOAF server survived rape and (attempted) murder

i bet it is not offended in the least, nor tormented with PTS

> So don't make such analogies.

wouldnt rape be harder if...

the hacker had to simulate an entire checksum depchain by hacking an entire series of servers

from <http://git.or.cz/index.html> ::
"Cryptographic authentication of history. The Git history is stored in such a way that the name of a particular revision (a "commit" in Git terms) depends upon the complete development history leading up to that commit. Once it is published, it is not possible to change the old versions without it being noticed. Also, tags can be cryptographically signed. "

i realize i should read Henry Story's Foaf/SSL/PGP/web-of-trust posts in their entirety.. eg <http://blogs.sun.com/bblfish/entry/cryptographic_web_of_trust>

i alwasy end up thinking HTTP1.1 and DNS are part of the problem. and afaik this list is about building atop HTTP1.1/DNS with new stuff like RDFa but not changing underyling layers to be more p2p/robust?

in light of <http://www.maya.com/file_download/126/The%20Wrong%20Cloud.pdf> slashdot'd

can someone point me to info on efforts to solves the problem of HTTP's reliance on a single point of failure for URI dereferencing?

Received on Sunday, 26 April 2009 16:48:00 UTC