- From: Kingsley Idehen <kidehen@openlinksw.com>
- Date: Tue, 08 Nov 2011 10:36:00 -0500
- To: public-xg-webid@w3.org
- Message-ID: <4EB94C60.6050803@openlinksw.com>
On 11/8/11 10:20 AM, Henry Story wrote: > > On 8 Nov 2011, at 15:16, Kingsley Idehen wrote: > >> On 11/8/11 7:29 AM, Sergio Fernández wrote: >>> I guest this article by EFF would be relevant for the people working >>> on this group:https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/10/how-secure-https-today >>> Otherwise, sorry for the off topic. >>> >> Sergio, >> >> Quite relevant, esp., as the following points ultimately help people >> understand the virtues of WebID based watermarks that drive the WebID >> verification protocol: >> >> * Break into any Certificate Authority (or compromise the web >> applications that feed into it). As we learned from the SSL >> Observatory project, there are 600+ Certificate Authorities that >> your browser will trust; the attacker only needs to find one of >> those 600 that she is capable of breaking into. This has been >> happening with catastrophic results. >> * Compromise a router near any Certificate Authority, so that you >> can read the CA's outgoing email or alter incoming DNS packets, >> breaking domain validation. Or similarly, compromise a router >> near the victim site to read incoming email or outgoing DNS >> responses. Note that SMTPS email encryption does not help because >> STARTTLS is vulnerable to downgrade attacks. >> * Compromise a recursive DNS server that is used by a Certificate >> Authority, or forge a DNS entry for a victim domain (which has >> sometimes been quite easy). Again, this defeats domain validation. >> * Attack some other network protocol, such as TCP or BGP, in a way >> that grants access to emails to the victim domain. >> * A government could order a Certificate Authority to produce a >> malicious certificate for any domain. There is circumstantial >> evidence that this may happen. And because CAs are located in 52+ >> countries, there are lots of governments that can do this, >> including some deeply authoritarian ones. Also, governments could >> easily perform any of the above network attacks against CAs in >> other countries. >> >> In a world where the following hold true, we have a real constructive >> tweak of the InterWeb: >> >> 1. self signed certificates are easy to generate and distribute -- >> basically one click and a .p12 email or save to local >> keychain/keystore or disk >> 2. self signed certificates carry WebID watermarks >> 3. WebID watermarks facilitate a distributed mode of certificate >> subject identity verification via the WebID protocol. > > yes, and you could put the self signed certificate into DNSsec, which > would reduce a lot the vulnerability to weak CAs. Yes! > Then some people are setting up mechanisms to verify that those DNSses > are secure in a more p2p way. There is some urgency in getting these > things to evolve, but people tend to scream only when all their > possessions have been taken away, and are sadly not very concerned > about future issues as one can see with climate problems and others. We humans learn from pain, sadly :-( > >> I can already do the above from Windows, Mac OS X, Linux, iOS5, or >> Android devices. 100% painless :-) > > Yes, WebID can be very helpful in deploying all of this. The DNSsec > dane group is really doing WebID for server certs where the > Alternative Names are not URIs but services i.e.: domain:port pairs. > Those could be enriched with https URLs for more information too.... > Yes. >> >> We just need to get the world to understand how we've made good on an >> powerful standard previously held captive by implementation myopia. We need to accentuate (in WebID narrative) the fact that SANs are slots for decentralizing PKI :-) Kingsley >> >> -- >> >> Regards, >> >> Kingsley Idehen >> President& CEO >> OpenLink Software >> Company Web:http://www.openlinksw.com >> Personal Weblog:http://www.openlinksw.com/blog/~kidehen >> Twitter/Identi.ca handle: @kidehen >> Google+ Profile:https://plus.google.com/112399767740508618350/about >> LinkedIn Profile:http://www.linkedin.com/in/kidehen >> >> >> >> > > Social Web Architect > http://bblfish.net/ > -- Regards, Kingsley Idehen President& CEO OpenLink Software Company Web: http://www.openlinksw.com Personal Weblog: http://www.openlinksw.com/blog/~kidehen Twitter/Identi.ca handle: @kidehen Google+ Profile: https://plus.google.com/112399767740508618350/about LinkedIn Profile: http://www.linkedin.com/in/kidehen
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Received on Tuesday, 8 November 2011 15:36:26 UTC