Re: [W3C Web Crypto WG] CfC : Call for Consensus on the integration of curve25519 in WG deliverables (please vote until the 26th of August)

On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 5:18 PM, Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org> wrote:

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> On 08/27/2014 02:10 AM, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> > Given that I view all the algorithms as extension specs, and would
> > love to pull them all out to that, I too support this.
> >
> > It's the same one way or another, which has been the whole point.
>
> I see the emails passed each other in the dark :)
>

Well, as per usual, I believe we're talking about different things. Please
do not consider the above proposal to your modified version (having an ECC
extension spec proceed to REC track simultaneously), which is not what Mark
stated (having an ECC extension spec).

The latter half is, naturally, the entire crux of the contention.


>
> BAL, would you support that if NUMS does not make it into the main
> spec text, that you would be OK with pulling out all ECC curves?
>
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 5:07 PM, Mark Watson <watsonm@netflix.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> >> I am finding the option of pulling EC out of the specification
> >> altogether and addressing it in a separate document more and more
> >> attractive: The first WebCrypto EC specification would contain
> >> non-NIST curves. We can work at an appropriate pace, given the
> >> dependencies on other groups and we can avoid delaying the rest
> >> of our main document.
> >>
> >> ...Mark
> >>
> >>
> >> On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 5:03 PM, Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 4:57 PM, Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org>
> >>> wrote:
> >>>
> >
> >
> > On 08/26/2014 08:39 PM, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> >>>>>> On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 4:34 AM, Harry Halpin
> >>>>>> <hhalpin@w3.org> wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> My opinion is the same as Richard insofar as"We should
> >>>>>> agree on the principle that we will support the next
> >>>>>> generation curves that CFRG and TLS agree on, and work to
> >>>>>> support that once it's decided." But we need to
> >>>>>> operationalize what we mean by "support".
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> The choices are having that curve in the *extension
> >>>>>> specs* versus *main spec*.  Given that all major browser
> >>>>>> vendors I know of will implement the recommended set of
> >>>>>> curves from CFRG to TLS and so exposing those to
> >>>>>> WebCrypto makes sense - and given the liaison
> >>>>>> relationship between the IETF and W3C and our commitment
> >>>>>> to harmonize as much as possible our specs - it seems
> >>>>>> that that those recommended curves should be in the main
> >>>>>> spec text.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> I strongly disagree with this, as it ignores quite a
> >>>>>>> bit about how
> > both
> >>>>>>> browsers and standards work.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Consider that TLS 1.2 was not implemented for years
> >>>>>>> after it was standardized. Consider that the CFRG
> >>>>>>> recommendation will be for TLS 1.3, which is
> > growing
> >>>>>>> in considerable complexity.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Harry, just because a spec (which itself will have it's
> >>>>>>> own timeline
> > for
> >>>>>>> review and discussion, and may change at any point)
> >>>>>>> adopts something
> > is not
> >>>>>>> an argument, at all, for an entirely unrelated spec to
> >>>>>>> do so.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Given that extensibility is still a bit blurry, it's hard
> >>>>>> to claim we have a good solution for extension specs
> >>>>>> quite yet. However, I also agree we can't wait around
> >>>>>> forever for CFRG.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Which is precisely what extension specs are for. We
> >>>>>>> didn't sit on CSS1 while waiting for VRML or WebGL to
> >>>>>>> come along.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> This in mind, we can move forward by either:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> 1) Have a "placeholder" text for it as a "Feature at
> >>>>>> Risk". The NUMS text could be that placeholder, with a
> >>>>>> note saying that this may be removed/changed if TLS/CFRG
> >>>>>> do not recommend NUMS.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> This is unacceptable. Placeholders in specs,
> >>>>>>> particularly ones that
> > favour
> >>>>>>> any particular solution during ACTIVE DISCUSSION, are
> >>>>>>> simply grossly inappropriate, especially for a spec at
> >>>>>>> the maturity of Web Crypto, compared to the maturity of
> >>>>>>> the discussions going on.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> So that it's clear that it's not NUMS specific, the
> >>>>>>> objection is to
> > ADDING
> >>>>>>> any new features that are "FEATURES AT RISK". Anything,
> >>>>>>> including
> > anything
> >>>>>>> in the spec today, that we believe is still a "feature
> >>>>>>> at risk" is something we should be actively working
> >>>>>>> towards moving to an
> > extension spec.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> and/or
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> 2) Go back to "Last Call" and add the recommended
> >>>>>> non-NIST curve in later in the main spec text.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Or 3), what's been said all along, which is "Add new
> >>>>>>> curves as they
> > become
> >>>>>>> available, both in specification and implementation,
> >>>>>>> and UAs are
> > confident
> >>>>>>> in the maturity such that they're willing to expose and
> >>>>>>> support as an indefinite part of the Web platform"
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I see no harm in either of these proposals and think
> >>>>>> either would satisfy the problem. It's not as simple as
> >>>>>> adding in NUMS or not. What we need is a commitment to
> >>>>>> support whatever TLS/CFRG recommend.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> If TLS/CFRG do *not* recommend a set of non-NIST curves
> >>>>>> by the necessary timeline for WebCrypto (i.e. getting out
> >>>>>> of CR by end of the year), in the first case we simply
> >>>>>> drop the "Feature at Risk" and in the second case we
> >>>>>> simply do not go back to "Last Call" but progress to Rec
> >>>>>> as normal.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Frankly, a spec intentionally placing something that
> >>>>>>> is
> > unimplementable AND
> >>>>>>> unspecifiable ("a placeholder") is unacceptable. A spec
> >>>>>>> intentionally placing something that is known as
> >>>>>>> "something
> > we're
> >>>>>>> probably going to rip out" - whether it be Curve25519
> >>>>>>> or NUMS - is unacceptable.
> >
> > However, it appears that simply ignoring the issue of non-NIST
> > curves in the main text spec is also unacceptable to Microsoft and
> > a good deal of real-world developers. So let's find a reasonable
> > position we can all agree on that shows that we have a firm
> > commitment to non-NIST curves but allows us to continue progress.
> >
> > My proposal is that the WebCrypto WG make a firm commit to honor
> > the desire for a non-NIST curve in the main spec text *regardless*
> > of our internal timing for transition to Rec.
> >
> >>>>
> >>>> You're asking the WG to make a firm commitment to something
> >>>> that is neither standardized nor defined.
> >>>>
> >>>> That cannot be done, and I hope you realize the sort of
> >>>> process violation it would be encouraging.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >
> > In the case that these are *not* ready by the time we get to
> > transition out of CR into PR, then we simply update the main spec
> > to have a non-NIST curve *after* Rec. If somehow they do resolve
> > before we leave CR, then we just go back to Last Call. Having a
> > "feature at risk" in the spec here makes sense so that developers
> > know we are watching the space and are ready to act ASAP, but it is
> > not strictly necessary.
> >
> >>>>
> >>>> Harry, you know an extension spec is equally viable for
> >>>> acting ASAP. The WebApps WG is perfectly capable of
> >>>> demonstrating this if you need historic examples of new
> >>>> features, such as Service Workers, that can be explored
> >>>> rapidly.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >
> > If the spec is past PR and we can't go back to Last Call, then
> > we'd just make it WebCrypto version 1.1 and put the CFRG/TLS
> > non-NIST curve in the main spec text then.
> >
> > Of course, if CFRG/TLS discussion - or if the CFRG/TLS
> > recommendations are such that that browser vendors never implement
> > - never resolves then we never update the spec.
> >
> > I suggest then we inform CFRG and TLS about our formal dependency
> > on their decision with the above plan of action. I believe this
> > would resolve the open issue for support non-NIST curves, although
> > I am not sure if it would resolve BAL's objections.
> >
> >>>>
> >>>> Let's be clear: I object to this formal dependency. I think
> >>>> you will be speaking for yourself, and not the consensus of
> >>>> this WG, precisely because we lack consensus.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >
> > In lieu of this, an extension spec for Curve 25519 need to go
> > forward as well along with double-checking extensibility. Regarding
> > how this fits in with BAL's objection to the CfC, IMHO a formal
> > vote should be taken on the NUMS proposal and more discussion on
> > the point re the algorithm parameters for curves, where again we
> > have a Google and Microsoft disagreement.
> >
> > cheers, harry
> >
> >
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I'm happy to check in with TLS/CFRG on the timeline and
> >>>>>> tell them we are considering an official dependency with
> >>>>>> them.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Note in the long-run having the spec being extensible is
> >>>>>> exceedingly important, as regardless of the non-NIST
> >>>>>> curves recommended by CFRG, various governments and other
> >>>>>> folks will want their own crypto algorithms. In this
> >>>>>> regard, the only other issue holding us from going out of
> >>>>>> CR is likely the lack of clarity over extension specs.
> >>>>>> While the spec does note that "This algorithm must be
> >>>>>> extensible, so as to allow new cryptographic algorithms
> >>>>>> to be added" there is little guidance after that.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> cheers, harry
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> On 08/25/2014 05:32 PM, GALINDO Virginie wrote:
> >>>>>>>>> Hi all, This is a kind reminder that this thread is
> >>>>>>>>> still live until tomorrow. If you have some opinion
> >>>>>>>>> to give, it is now. There was already an objection
> >>>>>>>>> to that resolution [1], but this is not a reason
> >>>>>>>>> for not answering to it. Any feedback will help the
> >>>>>>>>> chair to evaluate endorsement/rejection/alternative
> >>>>>>>>> to that resolution. Regards, Virginie
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> [1]
> >>>>>>>>>
> > http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webcrypto/2014Aug/0107.html
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >
> From: GALINDO Virginie [mailto:Virginie.Galindo@gemalto.com] Sent:
> >>>>>>>>> mardi 12 août 2014 15:22 To:
> >>>>>>>>> public-webcrypto@w3.org Cc: webcrypto@trevp.net;
> >>>>>>>>> hhalpin@w3.org; Wendy Seltzer Subject: [W3C Web
> >>>>>>>>> Crypto WG] CfC : Call for Consensus on the
> >>>>>>>>> integration of curve25519 in WG deliverables
> >>>>>>>>> (please vote until the 26th of August)
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Dear all,
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> I would like to call for consensus on the way we
> >>>>>>>>> will move forward with the contribution provided by
> >>>>>>>>> Trevor Perrin describing Curve25519 operation [1].
> >>>>>>>>> We discussed several options and I would like to
> >>>>>>>>> submit the following resolution to your vote.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Proposed resolution : the WG agrees on the
> >>>>>>>>> principle that Curve25519 will be added to Web
> >>>>>>>>> Crypto WG deliverables as an extension to the Web
> >>>>>>>>> Crypto API specification. An extension being here a
> >>>>>>>>> separate specification having its own
> >>>>>>>>> Recommendation Track.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Deadline : votes have to be expressed expected
> >>>>>>>>> until 26th of August 23:59 UTC Guideline for voting
> >>>>>>>>> : reply to all to this mail, indicating, +1 if you
> >>>>>>>>> agree with the resolution, -1 means if you object,
> >>>>>>>>> 0 if you can live with it. While silence means
> >>>>>>>>> implicit endorsement of the resolution, explicit
> >>>>>>>>> expression of vote is encouraged, to help the chair
> >>>>>>>>> measuring the enthusiasm of the WG participants.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Note the following additional information :
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> -          This extension will be used as a beta
> >>>>>>>>> test for the extensibility mechanism that we need
> >>>>>>>>> to address as raised in bug 25618
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> -          The proposed editor is Trevor, as long
> >>>>>>>>> as Trevor agrees to maintain the document
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> -          This resolution does not imply that the
> >>>>>>>>> draft submitted by Trevor is endorsed in its
> >>>>>>>>> current state, as the WG did not have a chance to
> >>>>>>>>> discuss the content. The discussion about that
> >>>>>>>>> content can be conducted over the mailing list, or
> >>>>>>>>> during a dedicated call, where we will invite
> >>>>>>>>> Trevor.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Have a great week ! Virginie Chair of the Web
> >>>>>>>>> Crypto WG
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> [1]
> >>>>>>>>>
> > http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webcrypto/2014Aug/0064.html
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >
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