- From: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>
- Date: Tue, 26 Aug 2014 17:18:06 -0700
- To: Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org>
- Cc: GALINDO Virginie <Virginie.Galindo@gemalto.com>, "public-webcrypto@w3.org" <public-webcrypto@w3.org>, "webcrypto@trevp.net" <webcrypto@trevp.net>, Wendy Seltzer <wseltzer@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CACvaWvZbN-dLFbq+zExN9u=Ev3waMR-iLDbwX+Ni-DMCq=LSZg@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 5:16 PM, Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org> wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > > > On 08/27/2014 02:03 AM, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > > On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 4:57 PM, Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org> > > wrote: > > > > > > > > On 08/26/2014 08:39 PM, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > >>>> On Tue, Aug 26, 2014 at 4:34 AM, Harry Halpin > >>>> <hhalpin@w3.org> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> My opinion is the same as Richard insofar as"We should agree > >>>> on the principle that we will support the next generation > >>>> curves that CFRG and TLS agree on, and work to support that > >>>> once it's decided." But we need to operationalize what we > >>>> mean by "support". > >>>> > >>>> The choices are having that curve in the *extension specs* > >>>> versus *main spec*. Given that all major browser vendors I > >>>> know of will implement the recommended set of curves from > >>>> CFRG to TLS and so exposing those to WebCrypto makes sense - > >>>> and given the liaison relationship between the IETF and W3C > >>>> and our commitment to harmonize as much as possible our specs > >>>> - it seems that that those recommended curves should be in > >>>> the main spec text. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> I strongly disagree with this, as it ignores quite a bit > >>>>> about how both browsers and standards work. > >>>> > >>>>> Consider that TLS 1.2 was not implemented for years after > >>>>> it was standardized. Consider that the CFRG recommendation > >>>>> will be for TLS 1.3, which is > > growing > >>>>> in considerable complexity. > >>>> > >>>>> Harry, just because a spec (which itself will have it's own > >>>>> timeline for review and discussion, and may change at any > >>>>> point) adopts something is > > not > >>>>> an argument, at all, for an entirely unrelated spec to do > >>>>> so. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Given that extensibility is still a bit blurry, it's hard to > >>>> claim we have a good solution for extension specs quite yet. > >>>> However, I also agree we can't wait around forever for CFRG. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Which is precisely what extension specs are for. We didn't > >>>>> sit on CSS1 while waiting for VRML or WebGL to come along. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> This in mind, we can move forward by either: > >>>> > >>>> 1) Have a "placeholder" text for it as a "Feature at Risk". > >>>> The NUMS text could be that placeholder, with a note saying > >>>> that this may be removed/changed if TLS/CFRG do not recommend > >>>> NUMS. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> This is unacceptable. Placeholders in specs, particularly > >>>>> ones that > > favour > >>>>> any particular solution during ACTIVE DISCUSSION, are > >>>>> simply grossly inappropriate, especially for a spec at the > >>>>> maturity of Web Crypto, compared to the maturity of the > >>>>> discussions going on. > >>>> > >>>>> So that it's clear that it's not NUMS specific, the > >>>>> objection is to > > ADDING > >>>>> any new features that are "FEATURES AT RISK". Anything, > >>>>> including > > anything > >>>>> in the spec today, that we believe is still a "feature at > >>>>> risk" is something we should be actively working towards > >>>>> moving to an extension > > spec. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> and/or > >>>> > >>>> 2) Go back to "Last Call" and add the recommended non-NIST > >>>> curve in later in the main spec text. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Or 3), what's been said all along, which is "Add new curves > >>>>> as they > > become > >>>>> available, both in specification and implementation, and > >>>>> UAs are > > confident > >>>>> in the maturity such that they're willing to expose and > >>>>> support as an indefinite part of the Web platform" > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> I see no harm in either of these proposals and think either > >>>> would satisfy the problem. It's not as simple as adding in > >>>> NUMS or not. What we need is a commitment to support whatever > >>>> TLS/CFRG recommend. > >>>> > >>>> If TLS/CFRG do *not* recommend a set of non-NIST curves by > >>>> the necessary timeline for WebCrypto (i.e. getting out of CR > >>>> by end of the year), in the first case we simply drop the > >>>> "Feature at Risk" and in the second case we simply do not go > >>>> back to "Last Call" but progress to Rec as normal. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Frankly, a spec intentionally placing something that is > >>>>> unimplementable > > AND > >>>>> unspecifiable ("a placeholder") is unacceptable. A spec > >>>>> intentionally placing something that is known as "something > >>>>> we're probably going to rip out" - whether it be Curve25519 > >>>>> or NUMS - is unacceptable. > > > > However, it appears that simply ignoring the issue of non-NIST > > curves in the main text spec is also unacceptable to Microsoft and > > a good deal of real-world developers. So let's find a reasonable > > position we can all agree on that shows that we have a firm > > commitment to non-NIST curves but allows us to continue progress. > > > > My proposal is that the WebCrypto WG make a firm commit to honor > > the desire for a non-NIST curve in the main spec text *regardless* > > of our internal timing for transition to Rec. > > > > > >> You're asking the WG to make a firm commitment to something that > >> is neither standardized nor defined. > > > >> That cannot be done, and I hope you realize the sort of process > >> violation it would be encouraging. > > It's fairly standard IETF and W3C liaison work to make commitments to > each other, which is done quite frequently when IETF and W3C have > common concerns. See current work around URLs. > > Having that commitment on record of such a decision to work with IETF > to find the bets possible resolution to the rather contentious ECC > curve debate might be one of the ways out of the current legitimate > demand for a non-NIST ECC curves. > > Of course, I'd also be happy to see the NIST ECC curves removed and > put in an "extension spec" tied to the main spec that could progress > to Rec track at the same time. That would at least put all curves on > equal footing in version 1.0 of the Web Crypto spec and prevent this > debate. > To be clear, I do not think we can nor should attempt to "rush" the ECC curves. Your proposal - progress to Rec track at the same time - is exactly what the objection is about. When the spec is mature, implementable, and there is consensus, then it can progress. Otherwise, any votes to rush through - including "placeholders" - ANY spec - would be an objection. > In that regard, it might help then we would also help the WG taking > the "extension mechanism" very seriously rather than having it as a > "second-class" citizen, which is what I think BAL's concern is re > putting NUMS as an extension. > > Would you agree to that Ryan? > > > > > > > > In the case that these are *not* ready by the time we get to > > transition out of CR into PR, then we simply update the main spec > > to have a non-NIST curve *after* Rec. If somehow they do resolve > > before we leave CR, then we just go back to Last Call. Having a > > "feature at risk" in the spec here makes sense so that developers > > know we are watching the space and are ready to act ASAP, but it is > > not strictly necessary. > > > > > >> Harry, you know an extension spec is equally viable for acting > >> ASAP. The WebApps WG is perfectly capable of demonstrating this > >> if you need historic examples of new features, such as Service > >> Workers, that can be explored rapidly. > > > > > > > > If the spec is past PR and we can't go back to Last Call, then > > we'd just make it WebCrypto version 1.1 and put the CFRG/TLS > > non-NIST curve in the main spec text then. > > > > Of course, if CFRG/TLS discussion - or if the CFRG/TLS > > recommendations are such that that browser vendors never implement > > - never resolves then we never update the spec. > > > > I suggest then we inform CFRG and TLS about our formal dependency > > on their decision with the above plan of action. I believe this > > would resolve the open issue for support non-NIST curves, although > > I am not sure if it would resolve BAL's objections. > > > > > >> Let's be clear: I object to this formal dependency. I think you > >> will be speaking for yourself, and not the consensus of this WG, > >> precisely because we lack consensus. > > > > > > > > In lieu of this, an extension spec for Curve 25519 need to go > > forward as well along with double-checking extensibility. Regarding > > how this fits in with BAL's objection to the CfC, IMHO a formal > > vote should be taken on the NUMS proposal and more discussion on > > the point re the algorithm parameters for curves, where again we > > have a Google and Microsoft disagreement. > > > > cheers, harry > > > > > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> I'm happy to check in with TLS/CFRG on the timeline and tell > >>>> them we are considering an official dependency with them. > >>>> > >>>> Note in the long-run having the spec being extensible is > >>>> exceedingly important, as regardless of the non-NIST curves > >>>> recommended by CFRG, various governments and other folks will > >>>> want their own crypto algorithms. In this regard, the only > >>>> other issue holding us from going out of CR is likely the > >>>> lack of clarity over extension specs. While the spec does > >>>> note that "This algorithm must be extensible, so as to allow > >>>> new cryptographic algorithms to be added" there is little > >>>> guidance after that. > >>>> > >>>> cheers, harry > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On 08/25/2014 05:32 PM, GALINDO Virginie wrote: > >>>>>>> Hi all, This is a kind reminder that this thread is > >>>>>>> still live until tomorrow. If you have some opinion to > >>>>>>> give, it is now. There was already an objection to that > >>>>>>> resolution [1], but this is not a reason for not > >>>>>>> answering to it. Any feedback will help the chair to > >>>>>>> evaluate endorsement/rejection/alternative to that > >>>>>>> resolution. Regards, Virginie > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> [1] > >>>>>>> > > http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webcrypto/2014Aug/0107.html > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > > > From: GALINDO Virginie [mailto:Virginie.Galindo@gemalto.com] Sent: > >>>>>>> mardi 12 août 2014 15:22 To: public-webcrypto@w3.org > >>>>>>> Cc: webcrypto@trevp.net; hhalpin@w3.org; Wendy Seltzer > >>>>>>> Subject: [W3C Web Crypto WG] CfC : Call for Consensus > >>>>>>> on the integration of curve25519 in WG deliverables > >>>>>>> (please vote until the 26th of August) > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Dear all, > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I would like to call for consensus on the way we will > >>>>>>> move forward with the contribution provided by Trevor > >>>>>>> Perrin describing Curve25519 operation [1]. We > >>>>>>> discussed several options and I would like to submit > >>>>>>> the following resolution to your vote. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Proposed resolution : the WG agrees on the principle > >>>>>>> that Curve25519 will be added to Web Crypto WG > >>>>>>> deliverables as an extension to the Web Crypto API > >>>>>>> specification. An extension being here a separate > >>>>>>> specification having its own Recommendation Track. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Deadline : votes have to be expressed expected until > >>>>>>> 26th of August 23:59 UTC Guideline for voting : reply > >>>>>>> to all to this mail, indicating, +1 if you agree with > >>>>>>> the resolution, -1 means if you object, 0 if you can > >>>>>>> live with it. While silence means implicit endorsement > >>>>>>> of the resolution, explicit expression of vote is > >>>>>>> encouraged, to help the chair measuring the enthusiasm > >>>>>>> of the WG participants. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Note the following additional information : > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> - This extension will be used as a beta test > >>>>>>> for the extensibility mechanism that we need to address > >>>>>>> as raised in bug 25618 > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> - The proposed editor is Trevor, as long as > >>>>>>> Trevor agrees to maintain the document > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> - This resolution does not imply that the > >>>>>>> draft submitted by Trevor is endorsed in its current > >>>>>>> state, as the WG did not have a chance to discuss the > >>>>>>> content. The discussion about that content can be > >>>>>>> conducted over the mailing list, or during a dedicated > >>>>>>> call, where we will invite Trevor. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Have a great week ! Virginie Chair of the Web Crypto > >>>>>>> WG > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> [1] > >>>>>>> > > http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webcrypto/2014Aug/0064.html > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > > > ________________________________ This message and any attachments > >>>>>>> are intended solely for the addressees and may contain > >>>>>>> confidential information. Any unauthorized use or > >>>>>>> disclosure, either whole or partial, is prohibited. > >>>>>>> E-mails are susceptible to alteration. Our company > >>>>>>> shall not be liable for the message if altered, changed > >>>>>>> or falsified. If you are not the intended recipient of > >>>>>>> this message, please delete it and notify the sender. > >>>>>>> Although all reasonable efforts have been made to keep > >>>>>>> this transmission free from viruses, the sender will > >>>>>>> not be liable for damages caused by a transmitted > >>>>>>> virus. ________________________________ This message > >>>>>>> and any attachments are intended solely for the > >>>>>>> addressees and may contain confidential information. > >>>>>>> Any unauthorized use or disclosure, either whole or > >>>>>>> partial, is prohibited. E-mails are susceptible to > >>>>>>> alteration. Our company shall not be liable for the > >>>>>>> message if altered, changed or falsified. If you are > >>>>>>> not the intended recipient of this message, please > >>>>>>> delete it and notify the sender. Although all > >>>>>>> reasonable efforts have been made to keep this > >>>>>>> transmission free from viruses, the sender will not be > >>>>>>> liable for damages caused by a transmitted virus. > >>>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >> > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) > > iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJT/SNVAAoJEPgwUoSfMzqcjr8P/2Heoe0EGJwYy/kUJY4u7huK > VY0/3pFs/osfWdAdBPwGSbwgmNZKoVTWsZ88WXWaouKsaSZxggWbuOXpJUfH8lPB > K64QxJQ3Y+FqSJtcvdA4lYWRknIcrUXbESD++nhcQKiruLEAvEBmqcNZa8V66H+f > A8jt64tSLo6taftEb3dxF9xY+/YE9iJXV9NANS0WKp+xT4EwW32l++tUZOG4kZiG > Uet4sCBddEayVb1HmSfox7fP576lN1QrFep+iy2Vr5ax5OHNQxKbHH//UWn1dgXn > HqvShiQ23hPa3JcMrDTi4Xs7gqQNUl5I/3EnT/3aa3RlpZMl240DvxA2dZ/fKk+j > mho7F7xGjjhH/4Owtgb2ANL5OFkJKTHDLXw/cuOM10rSBMV6cjcdveDDEGncXXzh > 3Da4JT9HTmhRQGD4kaN3eSZYRcvMMc1GkchF1+b3QcxtnptBVyhytUb709ohrPvf > E5C82T8AaexqHpgM6HjzyaXCmS35DOIk3KcwF8HCrPvC+fvCTTGyDOoEofpBtIt8 > 7zhPrgLStyPvUHZ9iNogv85iN+/oalPBcaJWjMbwKKZMBuf3dPZJFC8XHuh4zrzR > HORhVJVPXPHrQpGjmOuoEPCqVfWXMrCjWHAMwln+Xk2EeJVXmZ0V1jCsZ6gHcIE/ > BwpDJg9Nme9Rcq3mKkxe > =xK4b > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >
Received on Wednesday, 27 August 2014 00:18:36 UTC