Re: origin bound key generation

Ryan

Thanks for opening an issue related to this. We can use it to track the conversations.

I think that depending on how restrictive or flexible (and regardless) our origin-bound policy is going to be, it is imaginable that applications may want a slightly different interpretation or result. Today, browsers allow the (server) applications to set this policy for cookies  and I think we can extend the same feature to keys.

Seetharama

On 8/22/12 11:25 AM, "Ryan Sleevi" <sleevi@google.com<mailto:sleevi@google.com>> wrote:

On Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 8:30 AM, Seetharama Rao Durbha
<S.Durbha@cablelabs.com<mailto:S.Durbha@cablelabs.com>> wrote:


On 8/21/12 7:33 PM, "Ryan Sleevi" <sleevi@google.com<mailto:sleevi@google.com>> wrote:

I've been trying to find a way to propose text that balances these
concerns, but to be honest, I don't have a good solution. Part of this
is what lead to the proposal of requiring CSP, since this can mitigate
(some of) the security concerns, but I think there's still a lot of
security risks that have to be talked through and discussed before we
go too far.

Ryan,
>From my notes at the F2F, we had attributes of type scope (including access
control and temporary/permanent). These were supposed to be set at the time
of creation and read-only after that. Access control attribute was meant to
allow the origin to specify which sites can access/use this key (may be we
need granularity of purpose too).

My notes on access control had it related to key usage.

I have not been following the conversations much lately, but I do not see
the access control attribute in the draft (temporary is there). Has it been
dropped because of some reason?

To the extent it's been discussed on the list, there seems to be
opposition to granting multiple origins access to a key. See Mark and
Mitch's responses about wanting to have keys that are only available
to a single origin, and what I read as general opposition to
permitting key sharing.

While David mentioned it as a possibility, there hasn't really been
discussion on
1) What use cases it has
2) What the security implications are
3) What the behaviour should be
  3a) Can it only be specified at creation or is it mutable at some later point
  3b) The behaviour of pre-provisioned keys


The usage of Web Intents offers one way for origins to "share" keys,
and without undermining the fundamental properties of the key (eg:
allowing Origin-B to spoof messages from/to Origin-A).

I think it's something still reasonable to discuss if the WG wants to,
but we should open another ISSUE to capture the requirements and need.

Received on Wednesday, 22 August 2012 20:06:54 UTC