W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-webappsec@w3.org > December 2015

Re: [CSP] "sri" source expression to enforce SRI

From: Richard Barnes <rbarnes@mozilla.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Dec 2015 14:28:16 -0500
Message-ID: <CAOAcki8KcrKyZbn+Ov+T38ndJHx3mnYZBR-kr-rEPs2mxKN1RQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Brad Hill <hillbrad@gmail.com>
Cc: Patrick Toomey <patrick.toomey@github.com>, Joel Weinberger <jww@chromium.org>, WebAppSec WG <public-webappsec@w3.org>
I'm not sure I agree with that, Brad :)  CSP is where we place restrictions
on loading things, and "must have SRI" is a restriction on loading things.

On Tue, Dec 22, 2015 at 2:26 PM, Brad Hill <hillbrad@gmail.com> wrote:

> Yeah, we'd discussed a SRI policy header / meta tag to express a number of
> things like this, it just got dropped from v1 to get it out the door.  Not
> sure shoehorning it into CSP is the right choice, especially since the
> reporting mechanism is already being factored out into its own, reusable,
> feature.  Might be simpler to define a standalone header.
>
> On Tue, Dec 22, 2015 at 11:24 AM Richard Barnes <rbarnes@mozilla.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Some sort of "must-sri" directive is something we had considered inside
>> Mozilla for some of our properties, so this does seem like a productive
>> thing to look at.  I don't have any personal biases about how exactly to
>> express it.
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Dec 22, 2015 at 12:07 PM, Patrick Toomey <
>> patrick.toomey@github.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Yeah, a separate directive probably makes sense. I was originally
>>> thinking it fit into the "locations that are safe" pattern since we are
>>> stating that a location is only safe if it has a known hash (using SRI)
>>> from that location. But, I realize that is a stretch. And, you have a good
>>> point about being able to put other SRI related things in if we have a
>>> separate directive. So, yeah, that is probably the cleaner way to go.
>>> Thanks for opening the tracking issue.
>>> On Tue, Dec 22, 2015 at 9:32 AM Joel Weinberger <jww@chromium.org>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> That's a good point about SRI in general; it's hard to know if you've
>>>> forgotten to SRI anything. I'm not sure source-expression is the right
>>>> place to put it in CSP, though, as that's meant to be "locations that are
>>>> safe," and that's not exactly what you're requesting. It probably makes
>>>> sense to have an 'sri-options' directive, though, since we'll probably want
>>>> SRI 'report-only' eventually anyway.
>>>>
>>>> I've filed this as a feature request in GitHub, too:
>>>> https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-subresource-integrity/issues/23
>>>> --Joel
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Dec 22, 2015 at 2:50 AM Patrick Toomey <
>>>> patrick.toomey@github.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> We recently deployed subresource integrity across GitHub.com:
>>>>> https://github.com/blog/2058-github-implements-subresource-integrity.
>>>>> However, a few days after deployment we determined that one of our JS
>>>>> scripts did not have an "integrity" attribute assigned to it. It was our
>>>>> intent to add the integrity attribute to all subresources on GitHub.com. We
>>>>> statically vendor in all CSS/JS and use Sprockets (SRI support was added in
>>>>> https://github.com/sstephenson/sprockets/pull/645) to package these
>>>>> assets for production deployments. There happened to be one JS file that
>>>>> had not been vendored, and hence was not being packaged by Sprockets. This
>>>>> violated two of our goals:
>>>>>
>>>>> * Not allowing any dynamically sourced JS (we vendor everything to
>>>>> ensure what is in version control is what is used in production)
>>>>> * Enforcing SRI on all supported subresources on GitHub.com
>>>>>
>>>>> Reflecting back on this situation, it would have been nice to have
>>>>> support in CSP for a source expression such as
>>>>> "sri"/"sri-only"/"sri-naming-things-is-hard" to ensure SRI is being used
>>>>> everywhere. In the above scenario, the related JS would have failed to load
>>>>> and we would have identified both of the issues listed above in testing.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>
Received on Tuesday, 22 December 2015 19:28:46 UTC

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.1 : Monday, 23 October 2017 14:54:16 UTC