W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-webappsec@w3.org > December 2015

Re: [CSP] "sri" source expression to enforce SRI

From: Patrick Toomey <patrick.toomey@github.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Dec 2015 17:07:04 +0000
Message-ID: <CAN4Q8dC6WocH3qTM2PdCC7QGg21MZrYtTQShjanJje5e0RKqjA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Joel Weinberger <jww@chromium.org>, public-webappsec@w3.org
Yeah, a separate directive probably makes sense. I was originally thinking
it fit into the "locations that are safe" pattern since we are stating that
a location is only safe if it has a known hash (using SRI) from that
location. But, I realize that is a stretch. And, you have a good point
about being able to put other SRI related things in if we have a separate
directive. So, yeah, that is probably the cleaner way to go. Thanks for
opening the tracking issue.
On Tue, Dec 22, 2015 at 9:32 AM Joel Weinberger <jww@chromium.org> wrote:

> That's a good point about SRI in general; it's hard to know if you've
> forgotten to SRI anything. I'm not sure source-expression is the right
> place to put it in CSP, though, as that's meant to be "locations that are
> safe," and that's not exactly what you're requesting. It probably makes
> sense to have an 'sri-options' directive, though, since we'll probably want
> SRI 'report-only' eventually anyway.
>
> I've filed this as a feature request in GitHub, too:
> https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-subresource-integrity/issues/23
> --Joel
>
>
> On Tue, Dec 22, 2015 at 2:50 AM Patrick Toomey <patrick.toomey@github.com>
> wrote:
>
>> We recently deployed subresource integrity across GitHub.com:
>> https://github.com/blog/2058-github-implements-subresource-integrity.
>> However, a few days after deployment we determined that one of our JS
>> scripts did not have an "integrity" attribute assigned to it. It was our
>> intent to add the integrity attribute to all subresources on GitHub.com. We
>> statically vendor in all CSS/JS and use Sprockets (SRI support was added in
>> https://github.com/sstephenson/sprockets/pull/645) to package these
>> assets for production deployments. There happened to be one JS file that
>> had not been vendored, and hence was not being packaged by Sprockets. This
>> violated two of our goals:
>>
>> * Not allowing any dynamically sourced JS (we vendor everything to ensure
>> what is in version control is what is used in production)
>> * Enforcing SRI on all supported subresources on GitHub.com
>>
>> Reflecting back on this situation, it would have been nice to have
>> support in CSP for a source expression such as
>> "sri"/"sri-only"/"sri-naming-things-is-hard" to ensure SRI is being used
>> everywhere. In the above scenario, the related JS would have failed to load
>> and we would have identified both of the issues listed above in testing.
>>
>
Received on Tuesday, 22 December 2015 17:07:42 UTC

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.1 : Monday, 23 October 2017 14:54:16 UTC