- From: Mike West <mkwst@google.com>
- Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2015 15:05:57 +0200
- To: Axel Nennker <Axel.Nennker@telekom.de>
- Cc: Adrian Hope-Bailie <adrian@hopebailie.com>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>, Dave Longley <dlongley@digitalbazaar.com>, Manu Sporny <msporny@digitalbazaar.com>, Brad Hill <hillbrad@gmail.com>, timeless <timeless@gmail.com>, Eric Sachs <esachs@google.com>
- Message-ID: <CAKXHy=dm1iG2KYUONZ-VhwTOnFpUgLt_7hyuDJ9ABEEH+zGoaA@mail.gmail.com>
Yes. You may notice some similarities between Chrome's behind-a-flag UI and Account Chooser. -mike -- Mike West <mkwst@google.com>, @mikewest Google Germany GmbH, Dienerstrasse 12, 80331 München, Germany, Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891, Sitz der Gesellschaft: Hamburg, Geschäftsführer: Graham Law, Christine Elizabeth Flores (Sorry; I'm legally required to add this exciting detail to emails. Bleh.) On Wed, Aug 12, 2015 at 2:41 PM, <Axel.Nennker@telekom.de> wrote: > Speaking of UI/UX …: The OpenID Foundation’s Working Group accountchooser > has done a ton of this work in the past with heave involvement by Google. > > > > http://accountchooser.net/ > > https://www.accountchooser.biz/learnmore.html > https://www.accountchooser.com/learnmore.html > > https://sites.google.com/site/oauthgoog/ > > > > Would be great to apply these results to the browser. > > > > -Axel > > > > > > *From:* Mike West [mailto:mkwst@google.com] > *Sent:* Montag, 10. August 2015 08:30 > *To:* Adrian Hope-Bailie > *Cc:* public-webappsec@w3.org; Dave Longley; Manu Sporny; Brad Hill; > timeless > *Subject:* Re: Coming back to CREDENTIAL. > > > > On Fri, Jul 31, 2015 at 10:22 PM, Adrian Hope-Bailie < > adrian@hopebailie.com> wrote: > > Question 1: Origin bound federated credentials > > The fundamental question here is whether these credentials should be > origin-bound. In my opinion making them so renders this part of the spec > fairly pointless because I still need to login (using my federated > credential) on each relying-party site and only then can the RP site store > the federated credential (or at least link it to the new origin that it is > now useful for). > > > > Well, yes, except insofar as the browser can synthesize potential > connections for a user based on its knowledge of the user's browsing > history and stored accounts (as described in > https://w3c.github.io/webappsec/specs/credentialmanagement/#synthesis). > > > > True, but in this and your subsequent response you are simply moving trust > from the IdP to the browser. > > > > Well, yes. The browser is the user agent. If we can't trust the browser, > we can't trust anything at all, right? It's somewhat axiomatic that the > browser is going to be afforded more trust than any specific origin. > > > > Instead of a allowing an IdP to define which origins are appropriate for > it's credentials you allow the browser to do it through fuzzy logic that is > not clearly laid out in the spec. > > > > I've attempted to document the logic at > https://w3c.github.io/webappsec/specs/credentialmanagement/#synthesis. > I'm totally willing to believe that it's both fuzzy and unclear, so > specific critique would be helpful. :) > > > > I would trust the IdP ahead of the "intelligent synthesis" of the > user-agent. I have explicitly granted a list of RPs permission to use my > profile at this IdP for authentication. That trust is clear to me as a user > because for each RP I made an explicit grant. If I visit some other site > and suddenly get auto-logged in via my IdP I know that IdP can't be trusted. > > > > At that point, it's too late isn't it? You've already been identified > against your will, trust has already been violated. > > > > Realistically any IdP could already do this today. If I visit an RP site > and have an existing session with an IdP the two sites could log me in > without getting my consent but that would be a contravention of the > standard they are following (usually OAuth). > > > > Yes. Two cooperating sites can do this today. We're talking about adding a > cooperating browser into the mix, which removes the necessity for the RP to > opt-into the dangerous world of trusting the specific IdP. That seems like > a pretty relevant difference. > > > > 1. Origins are trivial to support, and probably handle the 80% case. It > seems pretty straightforward to include them in the API, and > straightforward to understand their function. > > > > This is because the IdP market has been cornered by a small group of > providers. I'm not in favour of a standard that simply re-enforces that > uneven market. > > > > It is both good and right to aim for a better world, but I'd suggest that > doing so by ignoring the practicalities of the world that exists today. If > working in terms of origins satisfies a large chunk of the use case, then > supporting them seems reasonable. > > > > 2. Protocols require user agents to bake in support for the protocol and > its variants, as well as an understanding of the protocols specific origins > support. That's certainly interesting for us to support, but is equally > certainly more work. Given the sluggish pace thus far, I'd encourage the > group to cut features in order to get something into developers hands that > we can gain experience with and build upon. As I note at the top, these are > things I want to support, I'm just not sure we ought to block on them. > > > > Yes, but there are a small number protocols and they could be relatively > easily in-corproated directly into the browser. Baking these into the > browser would light a fire under these initiatives and do much more for > getting rid of passwords than anything else in this spec. > > > > But baking them into the browser requires a deep discussion of UI/UX that > I don't think anyone is prepared to invest in at the moment. I can't speak > for any browser other than Chrome, but I don't think that I can reasonably > expect folks internally to really sit down and work through the flows this > year. I mean, we've been kicking around this smaller variant of the spec > for almost a year already, and I don't feel like we've made significant > progress in that time. Do you? :) > > > > Also, while there are a small number of protocols, my understanding is > that there is significant variation in dialect. OAuth2 != OAuth2 != OAuth2, > right? > > > > Without this I would argue it's not worth trying to push federation into > the first version of this spec. > > > > That's a reasonable argument. I hope the WG doesn't agree with you. :) > > > > Assuming it does agree with you, and the MVP for v1 is just passwords, > what would you expect the API to look like? One option would be to do > something like `navigator.passwords.{get,store}` so that we don't stomp on > the more generic namespace; in v2, we'd end up with duplication, but that > wouldn't be horrible, I suppose. > > > > -mike >
Received on Wednesday, 12 August 2015 13:06:45 UTC