W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-webappsec@w3.org > March 2014

Subresource integrity for third-party content

From: Jacob Hoffman-Andrews <jsha@twitter.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2014 18:48:20 -0700
Message-ID: <CADzQPXvcK_aC0NcfhinCKf4BGU39=JcnOySj5yP6-M1e4f7FxQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>
One of the key use cases for SRI is this:

> Compromise of the third-party service should not automatically mean compromise of every site which includes its scripts. Content authors will have a mechanism by which they can specify expectations for content they load, meaning for example that they could load a specific script, and not any script that happens to have a particular URL.

This sounds great! There are a handful of scripts that are very
broadly used on the web, and could compromise a large number of users
if their hosts (or their DNS) were hijacked.

However, I don't think it will work. Off the top of my head, the most
common scripts are probably: Google Analytics, Facebook / Twitter
social widgets, and jQuery.

Of those, only jQuery can be explicitly versioned. It would be great
if, e.g. Twitter could include an SRI hash by default in its code
snippets. But Twitter depends on being able to update the code that
runs its with its widgets, to fix bugs, deploy new features, and keep
up to date with internal display styles.

It will also be very difficult for individual page authors to
unilaterally pin scripts that they include. Unless the third-party
host is cooperating, the content could change at any time, breaking
pages that depended on it. Also, unless the script is designed with
integrity in mind, it may choose to load other resources that are not
protected by hashes.

I think SRI only makes sense to pin content that the page author
controls, but chooses to host with a third party.
Received on Tuesday, 25 March 2014 01:51:46 UTC

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