- From: Florian Bösch <pyalot@gmail.com>
- Date: Sat, 13 Oct 2012 13:58:07 +0200
- To: Maciej Stachowiak <mjs@apple.com>
- Cc: Anne van Kesteren <annevk@annevk.nl>, "Carr, Wayne" <wayne.carr@intel.com>, "public-webapps@w3.org" <public-webapps@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAOK8ODi8H9XFjrKU+_PgOjmF8sbfhQETL3725bcskw2n9gNh6A@mail.gmail.com>
On Sat, Oct 13, 2012 at 1:49 PM, Maciej Stachowiak <mjs@apple.com> wrote: > I think the most effective defense against phishing via fullscreen is to > prevent keyboard access. The original design for requestFullscreen had an > optional argument for requesting keyboard access, which led to a warning in > some browsers and which for Safari we chose to ignore as the risk > outweighed the benefit. The new spec does not have this parameter and makes > no mention of keyboard access. It is not even clear if refusing to send key > events or grant keyboard focus in fullscreen would be conforming. I think > this should be fixed. I think the spec should at minimum explicitly allow > browsers to block delivery of key events (or at least key events for > alphanumeric keys). Regrettably, this defense would not be very effective > on pure touchscreen devices, since there is no physical keyboard and the > soft keyboard can likely be convincingly faked with HTML. > I've got no objection against a user poll for things like keyboard interactions in fullscreen as long as the implemention honors the intent to show this once for a session or remembered state and not all the time when going back and forth. > The second most effective defense that I can think of is a distinctive > visible indicator that prevents convincingly faking the system UI. The > common notification to press escape to exit partly serves that purpose. A > potentially more effective version would be to show a noticeable visible > indicator every time the user moves the mouse, presses a key, or registers > a tap on a touchscreen. Ideally this would cover key areas needed to fake a > real browser UI such as where the toolbar and address bar would go, and > would indicate what site is showing the fullscreen UI. However, while such > an effect is reasonable for fullscreen video (where the user will mostly > watch without interacting), it might be distracting for fullscreen games, > or the fullscreen mode of a presentation program, or a fullscreen editor > Such a scheme would render fullscreen virtually useless for most of its intended purpose.
Received on Saturday, 13 October 2012 11:58:35 UTC