- From: John McCrae <jmccrae@cit-ec.uni-bielefeld.de>
- Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2012 13:56:10 +0100
- To: Philipp Cimiano <cimiano@cit-ec.uni-bielefeld.de>
- Cc: Guido Vetere <gvetere@it.ibm.com>, "public-ontolex@w3.org" <public-ontolex@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAC5njqq8XtV0k1MHF6=a+CBb6kaL_h=io4-MQ=CXKeEeTc6YMQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 1:03 PM, Philipp Cimiano < cimiano@cit-ec.uni-bielefeld.de> wrote: > ** > Guido, all, > > I appreciate your comments. Before continuing to discuss the ontological > status of a sense, let me provide some working definitions for "Sense" and > "representedBy". > Quick query... surely it is "represents" not "representedBy" as the lexical entry represents an ontological concept Regards, John > > Sense: meaning of a word w when intrepreted as referring to ontological > concept c. > > And yes, we represent the connection between w and c through sense as a > reification. > > representedBy: this captures the relation between a sense s and some > symbol c (constant). The semantics of "representedBy" is something like: s > is representedBy c <-> the axiomatization in c captures the ontological > commitment of s > > This means that we assume that there is some ontological commitment in > words and that this ontological commitment can be axiomatized (or not) in > some ontology. > > This still allows to be less or more vague. If we do not add any axioms > constraining the interpretation of a symbol, then we are maximally vague. > > So, if we take the word "bald", there is sure some ontological commitment > in this word. For instance, Bruce Willis (see attached picture) is clearly > bald, while Slash (the guitarist of Guns N' Roses) is not (see picture). So > there is some clear ontological committment of the word "bald", though in > other cases it might not be that clear-cut. > > Hope this makes sense and helps to clarify the notions. > > Regards, > > Philipp. > > > > > Am 01.11.12 11:43, schrieb Guido Vetere: > > > Am 31.10.12 13:35, schrieb Guido Vetere: > > > the model of Sense as (sub)classes that I've recommended (as is > > implemented in Senso Comune) would look like the following: > > > > ex:lemon rdf:type ontolex:Lex. > > > > ex:lemon ontolex:hasSense lemon_1. > > > > ex:lemon_1 rdf:type (ontolex:Sense AND ontolex:denotes ONLY <http:// > > dbpedia.org/page/Lemon>). > > > > Of course, if you want you can introduce a named class, like > > > > mylex:Lemon_as_fruit owl:equivalentClass (ontolex:Sense AND > > ontolex:denotes ONLY <http://dbpedia.org/page/Lemon>) > > > > to have: > > > > ex:lemon_1 rdf:type mylex:Lemon_as_fruit > > > > Can we consider this as another option? > > > > Philipp Cimiano <cimiano@cit-ec.uni-bielefeld.de><cimiano@cit-ec.uni-bielefeld.de>wrote on 31/10/2012 17:24:05: > > > Guido, > > > > yes, of course, this is an option. But where do you see the > > advantage compared to directly saying that the sense is a subclass > > of the class in question? > > > > Philipp, > > I think it depends on what ontology concepts and sense, respectively, > represent in your system. If they are both representations of the same kind > of things, then maybe there's not a clear advantage in the model I suggest. > Actually, in many IT artifacts called 'ontology', concepts are > indistinguishable from linguistic senses, so I understand where the > question comes from. > > On the other hand, if the ontology that you want to map with your lexicon > is intended to be a 'theory of the reality' independent from any language, > then you wouldn't say, for example, that the sense 'cat' in English is an > instance of the concept 'cat' (or a subclass) and therefore is expected to > have four legs and a tail. In other words, if you want 'Sense' to stand for > a specific kind of things, then you need to be 'multiplicative', i.e. > introduce an entity 'Sense' besides the entity you want it to refer to, in > order to keep predication on linguistic facts in a distinguished place. > Once again, if you are happy with saying that cats don't have four legs, > but they are just said to have four legs (in this view, mereology is just > another name of meronimy) then the distinction between senses and other > classes may appear to you as a useless sophistry (if not a dangerous > dogmatism). > > I can provide several arguments in favour of a multiplicative approach. > One of them, as discussed some time ago, has to do with vagueness. But I > think that we should be liberal with respect to different views of what > senses are from an ontological standpoint. If I understand the discussion > we have been doing so far correctly, we agreed to reify senses, which > means, at least, having them as mediating elements in data structures that > bring words and concepts together. Let's give a shape to this structure and > allow different formal ontological interpretations for it. Then we may > discuss pros and cons of each of them. > > Kind regards, > > Guido Vetere > Manager, Center for Advanced Studies IBM Italia > _________________________________________________ > Rome Trento > Via Sciangai 53 Via Sommarive 18 > 00144 Roma, Italy 38123 Povo in Trento, Italy > +39 (0)6 59662137 +39 (0)461 312312 > > Mobile: +39 3357454658 > _________________________________________________ > > > > IBM Italia S.p.A. > Sede Legale: Circonvallazione Idroscalo - 20090 Segrate (MI) > Cap. Soc. euro 347.256.998,80 > C. F. e Reg. Imprese MI 01442240030 - Partita IVA 10914660153 > Società con unico azionista > Società soggetta all’attività di direzione e coordinamento di > International Business Machines Corporation > > (Salvo che sia diversamente indicato sopra / Unless stated otherwise above) > > > > -- > Prof. Dr. Philipp Cimiano > Semantic Computing Group > Excellence Cluster - Cognitive Interaction Technology (CITEC) > University of Bielefeld > > Phone: +49 521 106 12249 > Fax: +49 521 106 12412 > Mail: cimiano@cit-ec.uni-bielefeld.de > > Room H-127 > Morgenbreede 39 > 33615 Bielefeld > >
Received on Friday, 2 November 2012 12:56:37 UTC