- From: Juan Caballero <juan.caballero@spruceid.com>
- Date: Thu, 2 Sep 2021 16:59:52 +0200
- To: Steve Capell <steve.capell@gmail.com>, Christopher Allen <ChristopherA@lifewithalacrity.com>, Joe Andrieu <joe@legreq.com>
- Cc: Orie Steele <orie@transmute.industries>, "W3C Credentials CG (Public List)" <public-credentials@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <8876db64-6bfb-a803-fcd0-de1155b5daaa@spruceid.com>
If only there were some kind of "rubric" document for navigating the market, or better yet, a podcast offering deep-dives into the decisions issues and goals of major methods... ;) On 9/2/2021 6:25 AM, Steve Capell wrote: > We’ll that’s true too > > A confusion of methods is tricky for the un-initiated. But do we > prefer to let the powerful dictate a few or let the market decide > which of the many survive. I can certainly sympathise with the “be > open and let the market decide” approach > > But with that probably comes some obligation to help users navigate > the market. Which method is supported by who? What problem does it > focus on solving? Which methods are seeing the greatest uptake ? > > I do find it a bit hard to figure out > > Steven Capell > Mob: 0410 437854 > >> On 2 Sep 2021, at 1:22 pm, Christopher Allen >> <ChristopherA@lifewithalacrity.com> wrote: >> >> >> On Wed, Sep 1, 2021 at 7:17 PM Steve Capell <steve.capell@gmail.com >> <mailto:steve.capell@gmail.com>> wrote: >> >> Can’t help but sympathise with the concern around the cacophony >> of DID methods >> >> >> All I can say is the many examples of the success of architectures >> leveraging multiple methods based on history history. In my case, >> Microsoft would have blocked TLS if we (the TLS editors) didn't >> support their Kerberos cypher suite, (a "method"). Which of course, >> no one used, and I later heard from one of the engineers was known to >> be more market positional than any technical reality. >> >> But Microsoft would have bounced TLS and used their only embrace & >> extend (effectively SSL 2.1) fork if we didn't accept Kerberos. There >> were also many more ciphersuites that were never used except in POCs. >> I argued in TLS 1.3 that we should deprecate more of them by putting >> expiration dates on them, and I also requested that we learn from >> that lesson and do the same with DIDs, but there wasn't consensus for >> this. >> >> My opinion is most DID methods will evolve or disappear as the market >> matures. IMHO this is the whole reason why we elected to use methods >> in the DID architecture in the first place. It also allows for >> innovation while discouraging blocking. >> >> -- Christopher Allen >>
Received on Thursday, 2 September 2021 15:00:09 UTC