- From: Daniel Hardman <daniel.hardman@evernym.com>
- Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2020 18:28:42 -0700
- To: Adam Stallard <adam.stallard@gmail.com>
- Cc: email@yancy.lol, Melvin Carvalho <melvincarvalho@gmail.com>, Wayne Chang <wyc@fastmail.fm>, W3C Credentials CG <public-credentials@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAFBYrUq1Zi=CEuVwcVD-_nUxrjafgY5pj4JzwBMz6rofCchsLQ@mail.gmail.com>
Of course that is true. However, I think ways that a system might be co-opted by nation-state actors are pretty different from ways that a system might be co-opted by an ordinary scammer. Protecting against malicious nation-state actors is often beyond the kinds of technology we can bring to bear. On Mon, Sep 14, 2020, 10:12 AM Adam Stallard <adam.stallard@gmail.com> wrote: > Daniel.Hardman, > > Yes, and have you seen what UBIC is doing with e-passports? > https://github.com/UBIC-repo/Whitepaper#sybil-resistance . The question > of "who watches the watchers" still remains. We can't see what's going on > behind the walls of a centralized ID issuing organization or know whether > they are making sybils themselves. > > --Adam > > On Mon, Sep 14, 2020 at 10:00 AM Daniel Hardman < > daniel.hardman@evernym.com> wrote: > >> There is a way to do one person one vote without losing anonymity. It >> uses a Sybil-resistant VC (e.g., a passport or driver's license that gets >> its Sybil resistance from some centralized system), but WITHOUT disclosing >> any strong correlator for the person in question; the verifier knows >> whether a person has already "voted" (or any similar once-per-person >> action) but need not know ANY other attribute of the person. Furthermore, >> the holder of the credential is fully aware that this technique is active, >> and can thus opt in or choose not to cooperate, if they prefer. Balance of >> powers. It was first described in a seminal paper "Clone Wars" paper by Jan >> Camenisch; for the less mathematically inclined, it was described at RWOT9, >> here >> <https://github.com/WebOfTrustInfo/rwot9-prague/blob/master/topics-and-advance-readings/zkp-safety.md#technique-2-prevent-link-secret-reuse> >> . >> >> On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 1:11 PM Adam Stallard <adam.stallard@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> On Thu, Sep 10, 2020, 1:03 AM email@yancy.lol <email@yancy.lol> wrote: >>> >>>> I agree that a one-person-per-vote system is ideal, however it's hard >>>> map such a system to cyber space directly without a central authority. >>> >>> >>> >>> It's hard, but that's what we're doing. Instead of trusting a central >>> authority, users should trust an anti-sybil algorithm they can verify >>> themselves. >>> >>> >>> Consider how one-vote-per-cpu can allow a way to directly prove the >>>> number of identities (cpus). For example we know some entity is 10 cpus >>>> because they solve x of the last y blocks. There is no need to trust any >>>> authority, only the solution. >>>> >>>> I think Git system might be the closest to one-person-per-vote where >>>> you can know about how many people contribute to the longest known chain of >>>> commits of a git repo (the trunk branch) aka the current consensus. Of >>>> course this doesn't map directly for a number of reasons (people are not >>>> simple cpus for one). >>>> >>>> -Yancy >>>> >>>> On Wednesday, September 09, 2020 19:09 CEST, Adam Stallard < >>>> adam.stallard@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> Verifiable credentials can certainly help. At BrightID, we're working >>>> on way for a decentralized group of computer nodes that analyze an >>>> anonymous social graph and make determinations about uniqueness to >>>> collaborate to sign a credential for a user. >>>> >>>> These credentials also have a notion of "context" to avoid unwanted >>>> linkage between a user as they participate in various apps and networks. A >>>> user of app A should be able to prove they're using only one account there >>>> without linking that account to an account in app B. >>>> >>>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020, 3:55 AM Melvin Carvalho <melvincarvalho@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I think this was the important insight of the paper here. And I >>>>> wonder if it can be solved with verifiable credentials? >>>>> >>>>> "If blockchains are to become a significant public infrastructure, >>>>> particularly in the space of civic engagement, then Proof of Work's >>>>> “one-CPU-one-vote” or Proof of Stake's “one-dollar-one-vote” systems will >>>>> not suffice: in order to enable democratic governance, protocols that >>>>> signal unique human identities to enable "one-person-one-vote" systems must >>>>> be created." >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 12:50, Melvin Carvalho <melvincarvalho@gmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> PDF is here: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2008..05300.pdf >>>>>> >>>>>> Keywords: decentralized identity, Sybil-protection, crypto-governance >>>>>> >>>>>> Abstract. >>>>>> >>>>>> Most self-sovereign identity systems consist of strictly objective >>>>>> claims, cryptographically signed by trusted third party attestors. Lacking >>>>>> protocols in place to account for subjectivity, these systems do not form >>>>>> new sources of legitimacy that can address the central question concerning >>>>>> identity authentication: "Who verifies the verifier?". Instead, the >>>>>> legitimacy of claims is derived from traditional centralized institutions >>>>>> such as national ID issuers and KYC providers. Thisarchitecture has been >>>>>> employed, in part, to safeguard protocols from a vulnerability previously >>>>>> thought to be impossible to address in peer-to-peer systems: the Sybil >>>>>> attack, which refers to the abuse of an online system by creating many >>>>>> illegitimate virtual personas. Inspired by the progress in cryptocurrencies >>>>>> and blockchain technology, there has recently been a surge in networked >>>>>> protocols that make use of subjective inputs such as voting, vouching,and >>>>>> interpreting, to arrive at a decentralized and sybil-resistant consensus >>>>>> for identity. In this review, we will outline the approaches of these new >>>>>> and natively digital sources of authentication - their attributes, >>>>>> methodologies strengths, and weaknesses - and sketch out possible >>>>>> directions for future developments. >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 03:21, Wayne Chang <wyc@fastmail.fm> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> link: https://arxiv.org/abs/2008.05300 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> discussion from strangers on the internet: >>>>>>> https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=24411076 >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>>
Received on Tuesday, 15 September 2020 01:29:10 UTC