- From: Melvin Carvalho <melvincarvalho@gmail.com>
- Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2020 12:50:05 +0200
- To: Wayne Chang <wyc@fastmail.fm>
- Cc: W3C Credentials CG <public-credentials@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAKaEYhJr9oSjt3ib=vrR8VAMESoST-4GGgqAqAO7P+Wi-=rbRA@mail.gmail.com>
PDF is here: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2008.05300.pdf Keywords: decentralized identity, Sybil-protection, crypto-governance Abstract. Most self-sovereign identity systems consist of strictly objective claims, cryptographically signed by trusted third party attestors. Lacking protocols in place to account for subjectivity, these systems do not form new sources of legitimacy that can address the central question concerning identity authentication: "Who verifies the verifier?". Instead, the legitimacy of claims is derived from traditional centralized institutions such as national ID issuers and KYC providers. Thisarchitecture has been employed, in part, to safeguard protocols from a vulnerability previously thought to be impossible to address in peer-to-peer systems: the Sybil attack, which refers to the abuse of an online system by creating many illegitimate virtual personas. Inspired by the progress in cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology, there has recently been a surge in networked protocols that make use of subjective inputs such as voting, vouching,and interpreting, to arrive at a decentralized and sybil-resistant consensus for identity. In this review, we will outline the approaches of these new and natively digital sources of authentication - their attributes, methodologies strengths, and weaknesses - and sketch out possible directions for future developments. On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 03:21, Wayne Chang <wyc@fastmail.fm> wrote: > link: https://arxiv.org/abs/2008.05300 > > discussion from strangers on the internet: > https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=24411076 > >
Received on Wednesday, 9 September 2020 10:50:30 UTC