- From: Steven Rowat <steven_rowat@sunshine.net>
- Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2020 08:25:47 -0700
- To: public-credentials@w3.org
- Message-ID: <9e8eab5a-0cb1-1168-5690-d88b735d4eb6@sunshine.net>
On 2020-08-12 5:04 am, Adrian Gropper wrote: > I see identity in terms of policies and capabilities. The policies > are associated with PDPs where identity matters and storage is > minimal. The capabilities are associated with PEPs where resources > are stored and the only identity that matters is the resource > customer or controller. I didn't know these acronyms; for others who might be following this thread, I believe: PDP = Policy Decision Point PEP = Policy Enforcement Point Correct? Steven > On Wed, Aug 12, 2020 at 7:42 AM Daniel Hardman > <daniel.hardman@evernym.com> wrote: >> Adrian, this is a very interesting topic. However, what I find most >> intriguing is your final sentence about how oracles have >> implications on transport and protocol. I would think that an >> oracle would behave exactly the same way any other issuer does as >> far as transport and protocol are concerned. So can you say a >> little bit more about what you have in mind when you say there are >> implications? On Tue, Aug 11, 2020, 4:34 PM Adrian Gropper >> <agropper@healthurl.com> wrote: >>> During today's CCG call we discussed ways that an institution >>> would make public assertions about their practices. The assertions >>> could be: - policies, commitments, or audits that are associated >>> with the institution in general, or - certifications, badges, or >>> licenses associated with specific individuals. Either way, the >>> assertions are typically public such as state medical licenses, >>> federal DEA numbers, voter rolls, real estate, food and liquor >>> licenses, law enforcement, license plates, D&B reports, court >>> filings, sex offenders, white and yellow pages, etc. Access to >>> these assertions was seldom limited before networking because >>> there was sufficient friction to keep all but the most dedicated >>> data brokers at bay. The friction also drove a business model >>> around sale of this public information. These public assertions >>> are now the feedstock for thousands of data brokers operating as a >>> broad surveillance mechanism, privatized, and without much >>> transparency or regulation. I call these public assertion issuers >>> oracles because it matches how the term is used in smart >>> contracts. An oracle's public assertions can be open, behind a >>> paywall, or restricted access. In the case of pay or access >>> restrictions, the reason typically has nothing to do with the >>> consent of the data subject. The restriction is based on the >>> credentials of the requesting party such as law enforcement access >>> to auto registry information or a no-fly list. Data brokers >>> consume assertions from other oracles and act as oracles >>> themselves, typically without the consent of the data subject. >>> Because consent does not figure into the practices of most >>> oracles, be they public or private, the only reason to introduce a >>> holder and their wallet is to avoid loss of privacy through >>> traffic analysis. That's an important feature but there are many >>> situations where the data subject really has no worries about the >>> oracle knowing who the verifiers are. Oracles can, by policy, >>> choose to erase access logs after 24 hours. The assertions are >>> often subject to revocation and having the verifier contact the >>> oracle directly is more efficient than dead-drops. In most any >>> case, the data subject can always choose to make a copy of the >>> assertion by the oracle in the form of a verifiable credential. My >>> point is that oracles could be using VCs regardless of what >>> assertions they're making or whether the VC is going to a holder >>> or a verifier. The only difference is whether the request is made >>> by the data subject themselves (to go to their wallet) or by a >>> verifier directly. Payment and revocation would need to be >>> considered, of course. Some oracles would need to process requests >>> as discussed in >>> https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-credentials/2020May/0049.html >>> using protocols like GNAP >>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-richer-transactional-authz-09. >>> Oracles as Issuers has protocol implications for both access >>> control and transport. How should we continue this discussion? - >>> Adrian
Received on Wednesday, 12 August 2020 15:26:54 UTC