RE: Materials from 2019-04-11 combined DID Spec and DID Resolution Spec meeting

RE: if we decide to "allow" them

Forgive my usual directness but nobody will or will need to “allow” anyone to use DIDs in any manner or context they please.

Best regards,
Michael Herman (Toronto/Calgary/Seattle)
Independent Blockchain Developer
Hyperonomy Business Blockchain / Parallelspace Corporation

W: http://hyperonomy.com<http://hyperonomy.com/>
C:  +1 416 524-7702


From: Markus Sabadello <markus@danubetech.com>
Sent: April 15, 2019 1:56 AM
To: =Drummond Reed <drummond.reed@evernym.com>; Michael Herman (Parallelspace) <mwherman@parallelspace.net>
Cc: Tim Bouma <trbouma@gmail.com>; Steven Rowat <steven_rowat@sunshine.net>; W3C Credentials CG (Public List) <public-credentials@w3.org>
Subject: Re: Materials from 2019-04-11 combined DID Spec and DID Resolution Spec meeting


I agree one of the strengths of the DID concept is that different DID methods will compete for trust while still being interoperable.

Unfortunately, I am not convinced that non-decentralized DIDs (Google, Facebook, DNS) will end up low on the list, if we decide to "allow" them.

Markus
On 4/15/19 12:59 AM, =Drummond Reed wrote:
I am worried that the arguments in this thread are not based on a solid understanding the role of DIDs in relationship to DID methods, DID registries (blockchains, DLTs, DHTs, etc.), verifiable credentials, and governance frameworks—in other words, to the "full stack" of decentralized trust infrastructure.

An actual DID record, i.e., the DID and the DID document it resolves to—which can tell you the public key(s), authentication method(s), and service endpoint(s) associated with the DID at a specific point in time)—are just one element that a verifier (aka relying party) must consider in making a trust decision about accepting a proof of a particular verifiable credential.

Yes, the DID of the credential issuer is a very important element in this chain, because if the verifier does not trust the authenticity or integrity of the DID document that the verifier resolved from the DID, then prima fascia, the verifier cannot trust the credential.

But at this level, the verifier's trust decision is not about the DID itself. It's about trusting the strength of the DID method and the DID registry that the DID method operates against.

When looked at from that perspective, I believe it becomes easier to address some of the concerns raised in this thread, because market forces should push verifiers towards trusting DID methods and DID registries that provide the strongest trust assurances. Almost by definition, single-provider solutions (e.g., Facebook for the theoretical "did:facebook:" or Google for "did:google:") would be low on that list because single-provider solutions are under the control of a single entity and suffer from all the disadvantages of single points of failure (no matter how "distributed" their actual network).

So would any other company that offered "its own" DID method.

Even a government that offered its own DID method might have trouble building trust in that method because presumably the validator nodes ("stewards") in that government's network are all ultimately under the control of that government—so the government could decide to fork the entire DID registry at some point and all the nodes would comply.

In the end, it comes down to a "virtuous cycle" competition between different DID methods and the DID registries they operate against for who can provide the highest trust assurances. Those DID methods will be the ones issuers will choose for their DIDs simply because those are the ones who will be trusted by verifiers.

I believe this point is important enough that I'll work with the other editors to craft a paragraph explaining this in the Community Final Draft  DID spec that we're trying to finish by the end of the month.

On Sat, Apr 13, 2019 at 7:02 PM Michael Herman (Parallelspace) <mwherman@parallelspace.net<mailto:mwherman@parallelspace.net>> wrote:
Initially, I believe virtually every web site that supports authenticated logins/sign-ins today will have their own DID Scheme …with high probability.

My favorite example is http://www.meetup.com.  Every meetup.com<http://meetup.com> member will likely have their own meetup.com<http://meetup.com> DID in their wallet.  Why would meetup.com<http://meetup.com> risk trusting anything/anyone else’s DIDs?  What’s the incentive?

Another example: Mike Brown is doing a great job at the Alberta provincial government owned ATB but why will anyone outside the province of Alberta trust an ATB DID?

Prepare to have a wallet with lots and lots of DIDs …at the beginning and for a long time  afterwards: Social Evolution and Technology Adoption (https://hyperonomy.com/2019/04/08/social-evolution-and-technology-adoption/).

Best regards,
Michael Herman (Toronto/Calgary/Seattle)
Independent Blockchain Developer
Hyperonomy Business Blockchain / Parallelspace Corporation

W: http://hyperonomy.com<http://hyperonomy.com/>
C:  +1 416 524-7702


From: Tim Bouma <trbouma@gmail.com<mailto:trbouma@gmail.com>>
Sent: April 13, 2019 5:28 PM
To: Steven Rowat <steven_rowat@sunshine.net<mailto:steven_rowat@sunshine.net>>
Cc: Markus Sabadello <markus@danubetech.com<mailto:markus@danubetech.com>>; W3C Credentials CG (Public List) <public-credentials@w3.org<mailto:public-credentials@w3.org>>
Subject: Re: Materials from 2019-04-11 combined DID Spec and DID Resolution Spec meeting

Hi,

Acceptance of DIDs will be something that the various trust frameworks will determine.

See section 5.6.1 on the IMSC Pan-Canadian Trust Framework Draft below

https://canada-ca.github.io/PCTF-CCP/


You will see Vectors of Trust as qualifiers.

We could add DID methods as another qualifier; it will likely be a qualifier added to conformance criteria for the credential authentication trusted process. As for trusting Facebook, Microsoft, etc., we will need to see how the ecosystem sorts itself out based on fair standards.

Trusting a DID is only one piece as there are many other pieces that need to be trusted.


Tim



On Sat, Apr 13, 2019, 6:44 PM Steven Rowat, <steven_rowat@sunshine.net<mailto:steven_rowat@sunshine.net>> wrote:
On 2019-04-12 2:05 pm, Markus Sabadello wrote:
> Slides, recording and notes for the 2019-04-11 combined DID Spec and DID
> Resolution Spec meeting is here:
> https://github.com/w3c-ccg/meetings/tree/gh-pages/2019-04-11-did-spec-and-resolution

>

In these notes there's a fairly long discussion of the possibility of
"did:facebook" etc, and what those silo's methods might mean. Marcus
said at one point:

> [2019-04-11T20:18:13.165Z] <dlongley> markus_sabadello: The only argument I heard that I understand a little bit from Joe Andrieu is that ... we could argue that the DID URL scheme as a whole would still be decentralized because you can argue to use which method you want. This would be a big change from how we use DIDs so far, but I could understand a little bit. If you don't want to use a facebook DID you can use Sovrin or Veres One. So the whole space [would be] decentralized though individual methods might not be.

As far as I can understand from reading these meeting notes, Markus
was pointing out what seems to be a major discrepancy between the
original goals (and still current via the DID .012 spec) and the
possibility that methods could be written for DID for did:facebook,
etc. that don't follow these goals.

I'd like some clarification about this because it seems to change a
lot that I had assumed was happening in this group.

Specifically, does this mean that, say, if Facebook, Google,
Microsoft, Apple, (etc.) each write their own DID method, and write
them so that they're as silo'd as possible (which they may well do),
then it's likely that:

a) There is no data portability for all the people using those silo'd
DIDs;
b) There may be limited (or no) pseudonymity or privacy for the people
using those DIDs; and perhaps other limits.

Is this accurate?


Steven

On Sat, Apr 13, 2019, 6:44 PM Steven Rowat, <steven_rowat@sunshine.net<mailto:steven_rowat@sunshine.net>> wrote:
On 2019-04-12 2:05 pm, Markus Sabadello wrote:
> Slides, recording and notes for the 2019-04-11 combined DID Spec and DID
> Resolution Spec meeting is here:
> https://github.com/w3c-ccg/meetings/tree/gh-pages/2019-04-11-did-spec-and-resolution

>

In these notes there's a fairly long discussion of the possibility of
"did:facebook" etc, and what those silo's methods might mean. Marcus
said at one point:

> [2019-04-11T20:18:13.165Z] <dlongley> markus_sabadello: The only argument I heard that I understand a little bit from Joe Andrieu is that ... we could argue that the DID URL scheme as a whole would still be decentralized because you can argue to use which method you want. This would be a big change from how we use DIDs so far, but I could understand a little bit. If you don't want to use a facebook DID you can use Sovrin or Veres One. So the whole space [would be] decentralized though individual methods might not be.

As far as I can understand from reading these meeting notes, Markus
was pointing out what seems to be a major discrepancy between the
original goals (and still current via the DID .012 spec) and the
possibility that methods could be written for DID for did:facebook,
etc. that don't follow these goals.

I'd like some clarification about this because it seems to change a
lot that I had assumed was happening in this group.

Specifically, does this mean that, say, if Facebook, Google,
Microsoft, Apple, (etc.) each write their own DID method, and write
them so that they're as silo'd as possible (which they may well do),
then it's likely that:

a) There is no data portability for all the people using those silo'd
DIDs;
b) There may be limited (or no) pseudonymity or privacy for the people
using those DIDs; and perhaps other limits.

Is this accurate?


Steven