- From: Martin Duke via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org>
- Date: Wed, 07 Jun 2023 16:09:15 -0700
- To: "The IESG" <iesg@ietf.org>
- Cc: draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures@ietf.org, httpbis-chairs@ietf.org, ietf-http-wg@w3.org, tpauly@apple.com, tpauly@apple.com
Martin Duke has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-17: No Objection When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/handling-ballot-positions/ for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- What is the position on including national crypto and other potentially compromised algorithms? Section 6.2 doesn't demand that the DE evaluate algorithm security, but section 7.3.1 says "The HTTP Message Signatures Algorithm Registry is one source of trusted signature algorithms for applications to apply to their messages." I could see a case for including not-provably secure algorithms in the registry to avoid squatting, assuming they are fully specified, but if this were the case the registry probably needs a recommended/non recommended field.
Received on Wednesday, 7 June 2023 23:09:21 UTC