Re: (rephrasing, sorry for duplicate) | Re: draft-ietf-httpbis-encryption-encoding

(Sorry about the delay, it's silly season here and I've been offline.)

On 23 December 2016 at 18:58, Kari Hurtta <hurtta-ietf@elmme-mailer.org> wrote:
> Hmm. I need rephrase.  Sorry for duplicate mail.
>
> Question is that well-known URI need to requested from all putative
> alternatives or not?. Yes, you can not request that from clear text
> connection now.

Ahh, so you check alt1.example.com and find that it's OK, what about
alt2.example.com?  It seems unnecessary once you have authenticated a
willingness to proceed.

How about:
"""
Any authenticated strongly alternative service can provide this
response. That is, as long as the http-opportunistic response is
valid, any authenticated alternative service can be used for that
origin.
"""

I understand that you might argue that there is safety in checking
every alternative differently.  That allows all alternatives to be
configured differently.

I expect that some implementations will likely check every time rather
than rely on cached values.  More so because - if you rely on your
cache - you need special logic to avoid caching this resource from
non-authenticated sources if you do that.  But that's optimization
territory and optimization is hazardous.

To that end:
"""
Clients that use cached http-opportunistic responses MUST ensure that
their cache is cleared of any responses that were acquired over an
unauthenticated connection.  Revalidating an unauthenticated response
using an authenticated connection does not ensure the integrity of the
response.
"""

See: https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/279

I am open to arguments that require that the check is performed every
time, but that's less flexible.  This seems preferable.

Received on Monday, 2 January 2017 23:26:59 UTC