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Re: Trusted proxy UI strawman

From: Adrien de Croy <adrien@qbik.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2014 02:46:12 +0000
To: "Barry Leiba" <barryleiba@computer.org>, "Peter Lepeska" <bizzbyster@gmail.com>
Cc: "HTTP Working Group" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
Message-Id: <emc8a5923d-bb40-40b5-a470-1e2cdc548104@bodybag>

I think any efforts to block out the possibility for intermediaries to 
inspect and modify traffic in HTTP would be wasted.

You're unlikely to be able to convince the operators of every corporate 
network in the world that they no longer need to do this to their users' 

Putting that sort of thing into http/2.0 would simply result in the 
failure of that protocol to be adopted / allowed in these networks.

Not all https traffic is desirable (e.g. malware downloads, uploading 
company secrets to file sharing sites etc).  The user is not always the 
one with all the rights, sometimes network operators must assert their 
rights and terms of use for their networks.

------ Original Message ------
From: "Barry Leiba" <barryleiba@computer.org>
To: "Peter Lepeska" <bizzbyster@gmail.com>
Cc: "HTTP Working Group" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
Sent: 19/06/2014 9:02:05 a.m.
Subject: Re: Trusted proxy UI strawman

>>  But the situation is much worse today! Look at the dialog on the 
>>  http://caffeinatetheweb.com/presentations/trusted_proxy.html#/3
>I don't see any sense in which the dialogue on the right is better.
>They're both useless, and neither should be presented to my mother.
>>  At least what I am proposing involves telling the user explicitly 
>>that the
>>  certificate enables the proxy to decrypt and alter traffic. And then
>>  provides an indication that it is active and a means to disable it. 
>>  don't see this as an improvement over the current MITM functionality
>>  supported in all the mainstream browsers?
>I don't see it as an improvement because it's nothing that most users
>will understand. To most users, there will be no difference.
>The problem isn't that we're not telling users that our proxies can
>snoop and modify. The problem is that we're allowing a situation
>where our proxies can snoop and modify.
>>  Again, because pinning is not enforced if the trust anchor is a user
>>  installed CA, browser manufacturers are in fact choosing to support 
>>  proxies. But they are doing it without informing the user when it is 
>>  enabled and without any indication to the user when it's active. I 
>>  understand why anyone would defend the status quo on this.
>It's not a question of defending the status quo. If we're going to
>fix this, we need to fix it correctly: we need to tighten up the
>protocols and how they're used so that we shut down men in the middle.
>And then we have to teach users to use only browsers that do it right
>and don't expose them. We'd do that through major media campaigns
>with understandable explanations, not with incomprehensible popup
>messages that users won't understand.
Received on Thursday, 19 June 2014 02:46:45 UTC

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