- From: 陈智昌 <willchan@chromium.org>
- Date: Tue, 3 Dec 2013 00:09:25 -0800
- To: Roberto Peon <grmocg@gmail.com>
- Cc: HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAA4WUYi47c9NhhQF6XedGDKcJE5tdWy9aguDN8nHKoAonL-zdw@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Dec 3, 2013 at 12:02 AM, Roberto Peon <grmocg@gmail.com> wrote: > CDNs, accelerators/caches, traffic-optimizers/traffic-shapers have > usecases that wouldn't require the browser to give up any confidentiality > (that the site didn't direct them to do, at least). > I'm going to ignore the CDN case, since I don't think they're explicit proxies from a UA's perspective (unless I'm misunderstanding). How do you serve cached content without knowing the URL of the resource? Are you differentiating between object confidentiality and metadata (URL/headers) confidentiality here? I think these questions apply to the other use cases you refer to, but am not completely sure. > For enterprises, the new trend is apparently to allow users to use their > personal devices. These devices would be outside the normal administrative > chain and would likely cause headaches. > I agree using personal devices would likely cause headaches. But you're not saying explicit proxies solves this somehow, do you? If so, I missed it. > > -=R > > > On Mon, Dec 2, 2013 at 11:37 PM, William Chan (陈智昌) <willchan@chromium.org > > wrote: > >> Pardon me if this is obvious, but it's not immediately obvious to me what >> will cause people to use explicit proxies instead of MITM proxies? Who is >> going to deploy them? The 2 cases I can think of are: >> >> (1) People who are using HTTP interception ("transparent") proxies >> (2) People who are already using SSL MITM proxies >> >> In case (1), it appears to me that proxy operators may want explicit >> proxies, because theoretically those interception proxies provide vital >> functionality that they don't want to lose if more things go over HTTPS. >> Because if not, their alternative is to use a SSL MITM proxy, which >> requires them to own the client devices so they can administratively >> install additional root certificates. This bears a high cost, both in >> perceived privacy impact and in requiring administrative maintenance. By >> this description, I suspect this group probably consists of network >> operators, like mobile network operators or ISPs or what not. I suspect >> it's very costly for them to have to administrate customer devices. >> >> But I don't see what an explicit proxy will help with here. Is the >> requirement that there be a way to automagically configure the explicit >> proxy *and* default to giving up one or more of the confidentiality, >> integrity, and authentication guarantees normally provided by TLS? I can't >> see a browser defaulting into letting automatically letting an explicit >> proxy MITM them. Will it just be opt-in (which, given how much browser >> vendors "love" presenting UI to end users, is also controversial...)? If >> so, is that good enough for whoever is deploying these proxies? I have to >> imagine that's very unsatisfactory for them. What's the vision here? >> >> Now, as far case (2), if the proxy operators can already deploy their >> MITM certs on client devices, then they already own those devices. This >> sounds like enterprise computing devices or schools or prisons or what not. >> Now, if they already own the devices on this network, what incentive do >> they have to adopt explicit proxies? It sounds like they would just lose >> power. Is there a carrot here? SSL MITM proxies are already transparent to >> the client and origin server, so I don't see what leverage either entity >> has here. >> >> Would love to hear peoples' thoughts here. >> > >
Received on Tuesday, 3 December 2013 08:09:52 UTC