- From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
- Date: Sun, 10 Nov 2013 04:11:20 +0000
- To: HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
- CC: Peter Lepeska <bizzbyster@gmail.com>, Tim Bray <tbray@textuality.com>, Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
- Message-ID: <FC56809A-FAE1-4CC2-937C-E26B08A54210@checkpoint.com>
I'm stumped about #3 myself. The literal interpretation is that you follow (or type in) an http:// link, get a response, and in the response learn that this is also available with SSL. So the client attempts to upgrade to SSL, and receives a valid certificate. So, yay! But in that case, why is the http:// link out there at all, and if anybody types it in, why not immediately redirect to https:// as pretty much all sites using SSL do? Also, I don't like the implication: No valid certificate --> No encryption --> No HTTP/2. That's a far higher bar than the goal that's set in the charter. We could at least give you ADH ciphersuites with no certificates. Yoav On Nov 9, 2013, at 11:04 PM, Peter Lepeska <bizzbyster@gmail.com<mailto:bizzbyster@gmail.com>> wrote: I never did understand option #3. What is opportunistic encryption with authentication? I thought opportunistic encryption is TLS-relaxed, which is encryption without server authentication. Also, I think the choices are different for HTTP 1 and 2 b/c HTTP/2.x doesn't involve a performance trade-off. For HTTP 1.x, the only realistic choice (assuming do nothing is off the table) in my opinion is: 1) Add support for TLS-relaxed in HTTP/1.x web servers and browsers but make it OFF by default. Performance impact is too great for HTTP 1.x so many deployments will not want this. For HTTP 2.x, I believe the choices are: 1) Add support for TLS-relaxed in HTTP/2.x web servers and browsers but make it ON by default. 2) Require Full TLS in HTTP 2.x. Peter On Tue, Nov 5, 2013 at 9:17 PM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com<mailto:ynir@checkpoint.com>> wrote: And #2 was only slightly stronger. On Nov 5, 2013, at 6:08 PM, Tim Bray <tbray@textuality.com<mailto:tbray@textuality.com>> wrote: I would have said the weakness of the #3 and #4 hums was very, very close. On Tue, Nov 5, 2013 at 4:41 PM, Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net<mailto:mnot@mnot.net>> wrote: … are up at: http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/browser/wg_materials/ietf88/minutes.txt Cheers, -- Mark Nottingham http://www.mnot.net/ Email secured by Check Point
Received on Sunday, 10 November 2013 04:12:00 UTC