- From: Joseph Reagle <reagle@w3.org>
- Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2001 17:24:36 -0500
- To: "Donald E. Eastlake 3rd" <dee3@torque.pothole.com>, xml-encryption@w3.org
On Sunday 11 November 2001 10:26, Donald E. Eastlake 3rd wrote: > - I think the Abstract is a bit strong and general. How about > something more like > > This document specifies a "decryption transform" for use in XML > Digitial Signatures such that, in many cases, it is possible to > detect subsequent signature invalidating encrytions and undo > them. Now: This document specifies an XML Signature "decryption transform" that enables XML Signature applications to distinguish between those XML encryption structures that were encrypted before siganture (and must not be decrypted) and those that were encrypted after the signature (and must be decrypted) such that signature validation occurs over the actual data signed. > - Why is it only applicable to EncryptedData? Why shouldn't I be able > to have a signature that includes an EncryptedKey in its scope and > still protect it? Fixed. > - Much of the XML is clipped by the right margin when I print it on > paper. Ok, I've tried to trim those a bit more. > - First sentence of section 6.1: I don't see that this has the power > to permit or prohibit anything. How about "facilitate" instead of > "permit". Ok. -- Joseph Reagle Jr. http://www.w3.org/People/Reagle/ W3C Policy Analyst mailto:reagle@w3.org IETF/W3C XML-Signature Co-Chair http://www.w3.org/Signature/ W3C XML Encryption Chair http://www.w3.org/Encryption/2001/
Received on Tuesday, 13 November 2001 17:24:41 UTC