W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > www-talk@w3.org > March to April 1995

Safe TCL

From: Karl Auerbach <karl@cavebear.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Apr 1995 10:19:50 -0700 (PDT)
To: www-talk@www10.w3.org
Message-Id: <Pine.SUN.3.91.950414093400.1435A-100000@pax.cavebear.com>

> > I, too, am very interested in safe-TCL, though I'm personally more
> > interested in using it to extend a Web server rather than to extend a
> > Web client.  I searched the TCL FAQ a month or so ago and didn't find
> > anything more on safe-TCL than a paper describing its design.  The

This whole thread of "safe" languages is rather troubling to me.

I spent more years than I care to count building secure operting systems, 
often using formal models of security and performing various degrees of 
proof of correctness on the software itself.  In essence what we were 
building were "safe" environments for the execution of unverified software.

The problems are these:

	- One person's "safe" is another person's security violation -- in
	other words finding an acceptable policy is very hard.  (Denial of
	service is a particularly hard concern to factor into a policy.)

        In many cases, people don't state their security policy, either
	formally or informally.  This is a real problem, because without
	a security policy, one can not judge whether
	  a) If the enviroment works as advertised, whether it is sufficiently
	     powerful to use for the desired job.  (I.e. if the policy
	     has a 100% prohibition against inter-user data flow, then
	     that environment would not be useful to support a multi-user
	     chat application.)

	  b) Without a policy it is impossible to evaluate the
	     implementation of the abstract "safe" machine to see whether
	     it is, in fact, "safe" according to the policy.

	- It takes work to gain sufficient trust that the policy is enforced
	by the abstract machine, no matter what sequence of actions are
	performed by the unverified software.  Some people do this by making
	the abstract machine very simple or very restrictive.  (An example
	of this is a calculator.)

	But it takes more work to determine whether to trust the more
	sophisticated abstract machines.  You can test it, but it's
	usually impossible to test all possible sequences of states that
	the unverified software may cause.  And formal proof of correctness
	is something that is very hard to do.

	- Sometimes the degree of trust of the "safe" environment can be
	reduced by allowing it to run only programs which have been
	examined and blessed.  This is the argument that many people
	make regarding the importion of source versus binary code -- if
	you can inspect it you may feel safer about running it.

In a typical OS, such as Un*x, we've spent years trying to build a "safe" 
environment in which users can write code which doesn't violate one 
another's security.  We're not there yet.

So we put people into restricted shells or application, which rather
limits the usefulness of the "safe" environment, often to the point where
the "safe"  environment is useless as a vehicle to get the needed job

Safe-TCL occupies this middle area.  It tries to find a useful balance
between a restrictive environment and utility.  For many people, this
balance is adequate.  It is likely that over time, we will find that it
is, however, overly restrictive to support some new, imaginative,
multi-user applications. 

I, for one, would like to see a policy defining what we want from a 
"safe" environment.

I'll start off by asserting that such a policy should support 
interactions between multiple users -- which implies that there can be 
data flows between the users.  (The reason I'm starting with this is that 
WWW browsers like Hot Java or Sesame (?) can easily evolve so that the 
users are interacting directly with one another through a matrix of 
connections rather than through a shared server.) 

Received on Friday, 14 April 1995 13:19:55 UTC

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