- From: Xiaoshu Wang <wangxiao@musc.edu>
- Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2009 16:52:02 +0000
- To: Dan Brickley <danbri@danbri.org>
- CC: Michael Hausenblas <michael.hausenblas@deri.org>, "www-tag@w3.org" <www-tag@w3.org>, "timbl@w3.org" <timbl@w3.org>, Richard Cyganiak <richard@cyganiak.de>
<snip> > If it is an IR, we know we can preserve it by preserving the > 0s and 1s, alongside information aiding their interpretation. The "it" refers to the IR or its representation? I think it should be the latter because we can digital preserve something's state encoded in bits but not the thing itself. This is, what I think, one of the culprit of IR-definition, to encourage the practice of psychological identification of representation with resource as I have discussed in my manuscript[1]. Philosophers are often criticized of hypostasizing or reifying things, that is, to create something for the purpose of one's theory. This is exactly what IR is doing. Nevertheless, we can follow WVO Quine's criteria. That is: hypostasis is O.K. as long as there is an ontological commitment. If TAG intends to define IR, define it in an ontology such as in RDF. At least in this way, people can derive some conclusion about it, other than an arbitrary term. [1]. http://dfdf.inesc-id.pt/misc/man/http.html Xiaoshu
Received on Friday, 20 February 2009 16:52:56 UTC