RE: What do the ontologists want

I was looking at it as it is a belief the sky is blue versus a fact the sky
is blue.
For example if there was a package that I believed would fit through the
door.
I believe it by "eyeballing" up the size of the package and the door.
I would assert Believe(I, (the package will fit through the door)) versus I
have taken
exact measurements of the package or actually tried to put the package
through the door.
In the later cases I would assert (the package will fit through the door).
It just seems to me that since people find the need to draw this distinction
between
believing and knowing that the agents should find value in that as well.

Pat
-----Original Message-----
From: pat hayes [mailto:phayes@ai.uwf.edu]
Sent: Thursday, May 17, 2001 7:16 PM
To: Emery, Pat
Cc: Graham Klyne; www-rdf-logic@w3.org
Subject: RE: What do the ontologists want


>Pat hayes wrote:
> >>  'Jon says "The sky is blue"'
> >>  'I believe Jon'
> >>=>
> >>  'I believe (the sky is blue)'
>
> >Careful, those are two different senses of 'believe'. You don't
> >believe Jon is TRUE, right? You believe that what he SAYS is true.
> >Write that out and your example looks more, er, logical:
> >
> >Says(Jon,  (the sky is blue))
> >Says(Jon, ?p) implies ?p.
> >=>
> >(the sky is blue)
>
>Shouldn't it be something more like:
>
>Says(Jon, (the sky is blue))
>Says(Jon ?p) implies Believe(I, ?p))
>=>
>Believe(I, (the sky is blue))

Yes, that would more accurately transcribe the example. I tend to 
assume that since "I" means the one who is manipulating the beliefs, 
as it were, that Believe(I, ?p) is pretty much interderivable with 
plain ?p.  After all, if ?p is something I am asserting, then 
presumably I believe that ?p, and then I would have to be pretty 
cynical about myself not to be willing to conclude from this that 
Believe(I, ?p); and contrariwise if I believe that Believe(I,?p), 
(and am not just trying to lie to my God, say), then I ought to be 
willing to conclude ?p. I guess there might a kind of existential 
state of self-doubt that would block this inference, but I do not 
want to make neurotic web software agents just yet.

Pat Hayes

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Received on Friday, 18 May 2001 09:45:28 UTC