- From: EKR <ekr@rtfm.com>
- Date: 09 Jun 2000 16:58:10 -0700
- To: tgindin@us.ibm.com
- Cc: Philip Hallam-Baker <pbaker@verisign.com>, Barb Fox <bfox@Exchange.Microsoft.com>, "Joseph M. Reagle Jr." <reagle@w3.org>, w3c-ietf-xmldsig@w3.org
tgindin@us.ibm.com writes: > First, your last statement that if there is no strong binding to the > document no electronic signature mechanism is useful is valid and, I hope, > not even controversial. If great ease of forgery (much easier than that > for conventional signatures, for example) can be demonstrated for a > signature technique it is good for nothing at all. > I ordinarily understand the term "biometric mechanisms" to refer to > measurements of non-voluntary characteristics (including voice prints) > rather than to speech recordings or handwriting, and I think most people do > as well. > The essential question about the mechanisms suggested here is "how > easy and undetectable is a forgery in this case"? Your statement that "if > I have even one sample of handwriting I can produce forgeries" is true to > some extent, but if taken as an absolute it would render any handwritten > signature on a document (probably on a handwritten document, but certainly > on a typed one) completely untrustworthy. However, such signatures are > routinely accepted for many purposes. Such signatures are accepted, but not on the basis of there being a strong binding. Otherwise, making your mark in the form of an X wouldn't be allowed. -Ekr
Received on Friday, 9 June 2000 19:56:52 UTC