- From: Andrei Sambra <andrei@fcns.eu>
- Date: Wed, 06 Apr 2011 23:14:40 +0200
- To: Kingsley Idehen <kidehen@openlinksw.com>
- Cc: peter williams <home_pw@msn.com>, 'WebID XG' <public-xg-webid@w3.org>
On Wed, 2011-04-06 at 16:47 -0400, Kingsley Idehen wrote: > On 4/6/11 4:16 PM, peter williams wrote: > > The single biggest road block I have is that my realtors take their personal > > laptop into their brokers office where they rent desk space (having just had > > webid working fine, over starbucks wifi); and webid stops working. That's > > because the larger corporate brokers run firewalls that intercept https - > > which breaks webid. > > > > This is the reality of my user group ; they are half corporate, half > > consumer; being intensely mobile. Though their laptops are windows home > > edition (or worse), which they connect to enterprise lans - at which point > > the DHCP service auto-issues the PC LAN connection a new web proxy endpoint > > - which then does the https interception (and thus the webid interference). > > To talk to the broker's sharepoint LAN site (which delivers them their > > broker backoffice tools), they have already imported the broker's root cert > > (issued by the local Microsoft CA). So the proxy (based on the same root) > > appears seemless to them, as it spoofs the real https sendpoint. > > > > Being consumer-grade users, they they just will not tolerate something > > working and not working, depending where they plugin their PC. They probably > > don't give a damn about the friendly broker doing the interception thing > > (the whole liability handoff thing is part of the realtor/broker handshake). > > > > Now, technically, we may have to develop a layer 7 bridge, in which one can > > post SSL messages over HTTP POST, to tunnel **past** the "interfering" TLS > > web proxy. This is perhaps where the ssl client built in a page's javascript > > comes in, I think. > > > > So Long as ONLY the client authn https handshake is tunnelled OVER the > > https-intercepting/interfering firewall, I don't think there would be any > > objection to a layer 7 SSL deployment that bypasses the intercepting proxy. > > Realty brokers (enforcing legal regulations on spying, snooping, data > > retention, etc in order to cover their very major financial liabilities) can > > still insist most "transactional use case" https traffic is intercepted. > > What about IPv6 with IPSec enhanced with WebID? Could the move to IPv6 > be an alternative route via WebID tweak of IPSec? > > Ok, this is the art of making research into a product someone wants to buy. > > Yes, but also one of the more extreme since the whole world needs to > unshackling from myopic data silos that already pervade the Web. > > I think being able deal with the following already hits the opportunity > cost palpability mark: > > 1. Sharing resources across Depts > 2. Ditto across Divisions > 3. Ditto across InterWeb. > > On the personal front: > > 1. Sharing ACL protected resources across InterWeb -- photos, music, > videos, bookmarks, calendars, addressbooks, reports etc.. > 2. ACL protecting comments - blogs, wikis etc.. > 3. Smart notification services -- SemanticPingbacks vs broken Web 2.0 > Pingback > 4. Inbox reclaim -- WebID enhanced S/MIME (which we've already > implemented successfully). > > I am actually doing research on these topics, as part of my PhD. (though I've recently started), so I should be able to at least get an overview of current possibilities and maybe propose some improvements soon. I will try to put together a small "paper" on it. Andrei > Kingsley > > > > > > It has to actually work in the reality folks live in, not research reality. > > I don't mind selling the future a bit (to show the movement has 5+ years of > > momentum), but it HAS to actually work, today. > > > > Ok. Is there anything a browser vendor can do to help enable SSL engines - > > running in javascript? > > > > For windows for example, they can make the SSL ciphersuites available to the > > COM API usable by IE-hosted pages, so the platform's primitives deliver the > > specialized SSL HMACing, and the sessionid caching, etc > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: public-xg-webid-request@w3.org [mailto:public-xg-webid-request@w3.org] > > On Behalf Of Kingsley Idehen > > Sent: Wednesday, April 06, 2011 9:21 AM > > To: Peter Williams > > Cc: WebID XG > > Subject: Re: How to request a WebID? > > > > On 4/6/11 11:58 AM, Peter Williams wrote: > >> Using the myxwiki as a test platform, I found something strange: > >> > >> Having used opera to enroll and the export the credentials to a . P12 > >> file > >> > >> 1 I could complete webid using an opera browser on several versions of > >> windows (having imported the .p12) > >> > >> 2 I could do the same with install versions of ie 8 and 9 (after .p12 > > import). > >> 3 on the same pc as the ie case, my own https client will fail to complete > > webid - using the same certs as available to ie. (all acls, etc, were > > addressed). Something in the webservice client/server lib for the x509token > > validator behavior seems to prevent the cert bring used (even though it > > supplied as the desired cert at the API). > >> If I guess, it's because the cert from myxwiki is missing the pkix client > > authn oid. But this is only a guess. I cannot easily tell where the enforcer > > might be: whether it's clientside or serverside enforced. > > Peter, > > > > I assume you are repeating these tests using: > > http://id.myopenlink.net/ods ? I would appreciate QA and feedback re. > > that ODS based service too. > > > > You should be able to use IE, Safari, FF, Opera, and Chrome. > > > > Safari, IE, Chrome, and FF (plus .NET extension) will talk to the local host > > OS key store. > > > > Opera and FF (modulo .NET extension) use their own stores. > > > > > > Kingsley > >> On Apr 6, 2011, at 8:29 AM, Henry Story<henry.story@bblfish.net> wrote: > >> > >>> On 6 Apr 2011, at 17:18, Peter Williams wrote: > >>> > >>>> What l learned by trial is that not all browsers use the hints in the ca > > message of ssl. Others use it, quite literally. Both behaviours are > > conforming, as the message contains hints (only) by design. Your > > implementation may cue off the hints, or it may ignore them. Opera ignores. > > Ie uses. I dont know what safari does. I don't know what 10 browsers in > > iPhone-like phone browsers do. > >>> That's what we need a precise description of. Which browsers do, > >>> which don't. If enough do it, then it may be worth working on this. It > > comes up regularly. > >>> So I'll add to the issue that it requires working out which browsers this > > functions on. > >>>> In my https client, I uses a STD dialog of windows, also used by ie I > > suspect. The dialog allows several selectors, each of which constrain which > > of the certs in a users personal trust store are shown. (I don't know if > > this works on a windows phone, though.) Two options are natural (they are > > the kind of knowhow a security professional would be expected to show, on a > > certification test): using cert policy oid (as selector), using application > > policy oid (as selector). > >>>> There is another angle: whether any and all (selected) certs should be > > shown that match, or only those that have the netscape (or better the iso) > > client usage oid. But this begs yet another question: must that extension be > > marked critical? If it's not, an implementation is entitled to ignore it's > > hint. Thus unit test for client tend to be platform specific, unless one is > > careful. > >>> The Java libraries I have been working with add the netscape client > >>> usage oid. Anyone testing should try to get an idea of how each > >>> browser works currently, taking those into account. The we can see where > > we are starting from. > >>> > >>> > > > >
Received on Wednesday, 6 April 2011 21:16:12 UTC