- From: Mary Ellen Zurko <Mary_Ellen_Zurko@notesdev.ibm.com>
- Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2007 17:22:42 -0500
- To: pbaker@verisign.com
- Cc: public-wsc-wg@w3.org
- Message-ID: <OFAAE49BC5.A7FD90AB-ON85257266.007AE2B8-85257266.007AF425@LocalDomain>
The proposal is ill formed, as it doesn't represent the merging of the goal and non goal information you have as an action. Nevertheless, move it to the (merged version you will also do) in the wiki. Mez "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com> Sent by: public-wsc-wg-request@w3.org 01/09/2007 10:15 AM To "Hal Lockhart" <hlockhar@bea.com>, <public-wsc-wg@w3.org> cc Subject RE: Close ACTION-56 and ACTION-62 In response to Hal's comments on Action 56/62 I propose ammending the goals as follows Goals Catalog the existing context information provided to the users of the Web. Consider the interpretations that users reasonably infer from existing information. Set out a series of use cases and abuse cases specifying commonplace security sensitive Web transactions and likely forms of criminal attack respectively. Analyze context information the user requires to safely complete the proposed use cases and prevent abuse cases. Perform a gap analysis to identity areas where the context information provided to the user is either insufficient or misleading Propose changes to the presentation of existing context information and additional context information that might be provided to close the identified security gaps. Propose a limited set of security conditions that may be used to sumarize the risk status to the user. Non Goals The group will not attempt to solve the following problems: Provision of trustworthy computing platforms. Design of cryptographic algorithms or protocols. Algorithms for evaluating the security condition from the risk factors. Rationale (sumarizing Hal): There is an aversion to specifying how to determine whether we are in a high security or high risk situation, this is undoubtedly correct since the calculation is dependent on the current threat environment and thus changeable. We do not want to standardize the mapping of risk to reporting as it may change and we want to encourage development in this area. On the other had we do want to be able to come to a common understanding of the number of security quanta (e,g, High, Low, unknown) and ensure that browsers A and B do not use the same signs to represent opposite meaning.
Received on Wednesday, 17 January 2007 22:23:05 UTC