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Re: Ban ICE-LITE? webRTC and Content Security Policy connect-src

From: Sergio Garcia Murillo <sergio.garcia.murillo@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2018 15:10:51 +0100
To: Byron Campen <docfaraday@gmail.com>, Lennart Grahl <lennart.grahl@gmail.com>
Cc: Harald Alvestrand <harald@alvestrand.no>, T H Panton <thp@westhawk.co.uk>, Iñaki Baz Castillo <ibc@aliax.net>, Cullen Jennings <fluffy@iii.ca>, public-webrtc@w3.org
Message-ID: <ac228d4d-61db-bfdf-c3bf-09093d093d5c@gmail.com>
My understanding is that if we add the stun/turn urls to CSP, a 
peerconnection will not be allowed to be created if no valid stun/turn 
servers are used.


On 12/01/2018 15:03, Byron Campen wrote:
>     The STUN/TURN servers don't matter here; this works without them.
> Best regards,
> Byron Campen
> On 1/12/18 7:57 AM, Sergio Garcia Murillo wrote:
>> You could consider that if you have the sun/turn urls on your CSP 
>> they would be authenticated. So the malicious code should first learn 
>> how to get the username/pwd for your service before doing what you say.
>> A the code is already running on the your browser, it would 
>> definitively be able to do that and the proposed solution would just 
>> make it more difficult to perform a general attack, but not a 
>> targeted one to a specific server using webrtc. Note that people not 
>> using webrtc will be safe anyway.
>> Best regards
>> Sergio
>> On 12/01/2018 14:52, Lennart Grahl wrote:
>>> I'm not sure restricting STUN/TURN servers, or banning ICE lite, or 
>>> what
>>> you've suggested now would resolve this issue:
>>> What if I create an RTCPeerConnection and I use allowed STUN/TURN
>>> servers (if any). I create an offer and provide a fake answer with some
>>> data encoded as part of ICE ufrag/pwd. Then I'll pass fake remote
>>> candidates that include an IP I want to send this information to. The
>>> ICE agent will start sending STUN binding requests to that IP which
>>> contains my data as part of the username. Shouldn't that work?
>>> Cheers
>>> Lennart
>>> On 12.01.2018 14:46, Sergio Garcia Murillo wrote:
>>>> Disclaimer: I did my ICE lite implementation 5 years ago, so I maybe
>>>> completely wrong.
>>>> We are assuming that ICE lite is less secure that full ICE because in
>>>> full ICE you need to know the remote ufrag in order to create the
>>>> request, right?
>>>> But that information will be available at the full ice endpoint as 
>>>> soon
>>>> as the first incoming stun binding request is received. So wouldn't 
>>>> this
>>>> mean that both full ice and ice lite are equally insecure?
>>>> As Iñaki is pointing out what would be needed is to use the remote pwd
>>>> (which is not exchanged in stun request) in order to authenticate also
>>>> the remote peer. This is something I have never understood about ICE,
>>>> why it requires both ufrags to form the username, but only uses the
>>>> local password for fingerprinting (I assume is to speed up setup up
>>>> times not having to wait for remote peer info before starting ICE).
>>>> Using local_pwd:remote_pwd for fingerprinting would solve this issue
>>>> altogether for both ice and ice-lite.
>>>> Best regards
>>>> Sergio
>>>> On 12/01/2018 14:19, Harald Alvestrand wrote:
>>>>> To me, it sounds like we should ban ICE-LITE altogether.
>>>>> We've got a lot of security story resting on the idea that the ICE
>>>>> request/response requires both ends to have seen the SDP.
>>>>> If that isn't true for ICE-LITE, then ICE-LITE is not safe for 
>>>>> WebRTC.
>>>>> On 01/12/2018 01:20 PM, Sergio Garcia Murillo wrote:
>>>>>> Missed it, that will prevent it, right.
>>>>>> On 12/01/2018 13:11, T H Panton wrote:
>>>>>>> That's covered in my proposal:
>>>>>>>>      add a CSP turn-servers whitelist (to prevent leakage via the
>>>>>>>>      credentials)
Received on Friday, 12 January 2018 14:11:18 UTC

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