- From: Henry Story <henry.story@bblfish.net>
- Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2012 18:14:33 +0200
- To: Janne Snabb <snabb@epipe.com>
- Cc: dane@ietf.org
On 11 Jun 2012, at 17:29, Janne Snabb wrote: > Hi, > > I looked at the current DANE specifications and drafts with my mail > server admin hat on and was surprised to notice that there is nothing > about client certificate validation. > > Is this an intentional omission? Is it something that is postponed for > later date? Once you have Dane for server authentication it makes client authentication with WebID even easier to deploy. See the spec on the w3c at http://webid.info/spec/ You can also see the short video explaining how that works at http://webid.info/ And you can join the community at http://www.w3.org/community/webid/ It is also possible to extend this for trust of issuers as I argued recently in WebID and eCommerce: http://bblfish.net/blog/2012/04/30/ Henry > > I tried to look through the mailing list archives, but did not find > anything relevant. The DANE WG charter does not seem to be limited to > server authentication, it just talks about authentication of "Named > Entities" which in my mind can be both clients and servers. Obviously > many people are only thinking about web site certificates and web browsers. > > Looks like the current DANE specification could be called DANSE > (DNS-based Authentication of Named _Server_ Entities). It could be > relatively easily extended to cover client authentication (DANCE: > DNS-based Authentication of Named _Client_ Entities). DANSE+DANCE could > then be finally called DANE when merged together. :) > > > I was thinking that something similar to the following could work: > > 1. Mail server foo.example.com wants to send an e-mail to mail server > bar.example.net using SMTP. > > 2. foo.example.com opens a TCP connection to bar.example.net port 25 and > issues STARTTLS. foo.example.com might verify the server certificate of > bar.example.net with DAN(S)E or it might not. > > 3. bar.example.net requests a client certificate in the TLS handshake. > > 4. foo.example.com supplies a client certificate to certify that the > SMTP connection really comes from it and not from someone who has > hijacked their IP address. > > 5. bar.example.net is configured to verify SMTP senders using DANCE. It > performs the following DNS lookups and validations: > A. reverse lookup the client IP address (returns foo.example.com) > B. lookup A/AAAA records of foo.example.com and ensure that one of the > returned IP addresses matches the IP of the incoming connection > C. lookup TLSA records of _25._tcp._client.foo.example.com (the label > "_client" could be something different, this is just an example) > D. verify that one of the TLSA records matches the client certificate > > (Lookups C and probably B need to be DNSSEC validated. Lookup A does not > need to be DNSSEC validated.) > > 6. At this point bar.example.net knows if foo.example.com authenticated > with the correct certificate and can proceed accordingly depending on > the local policies. It might reject the connection/e-mail if the client > did not provide the correct certificate. > > > This way a named client entity (typically a server of some sort, not a > end-user workstation) could securely announce that when connecting to a > well-known port at any other entity it shall authenticate using a > specific client certificate (or a certificate signed by specific CA). > > IMHO it seems pretty pointless to implement DANE for SMTP without the > ability to verify both sides of the conversation. > > Any thoughts? > > -- > Janne Snabb / EPIPE Communications > snabb@epipe.com - http://epipe.com/ > _______________________________________________ > dane mailing list > dane@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dane Social Web Architect http://bblfish.net/
Received on Monday, 11 June 2012 16:15:35 UTC