- From: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>
- Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2012 11:55:35 -0700
- To: Seetharama Rao Durbha <S.Durbha@cablelabs.com>
- Cc: Vijay Bharadwaj <Vijay.Bharadwaj@microsoft.com>, Lu HongQian Karen <karen.lu@gemalto.com>, Ali Asad <Asad.Ali@gemalto.com>, GALINDO Virginie <Virginie.GALINDO@gemalto.com>, "public-webcrypto@w3.org" <public-webcrypto@w3.org>
On Fri, Sep 7, 2012 at 8:02 AM, Seetharama Rao Durbha <S.Durbha@cablelabs.com> wrote: > On 9/7/12 12:00 AM, "Vijay Bharadwaj" <Vijay.Bharadwaj@microsoft.com> wrote: > > Ø I would like to agree with you. But that is assuming that a user has only > one identity tied to an application – not always true. We all have multiple > accounts with the same providers. Some identities may be stronger than > others – the user may have some in the browser, and some in smart card(s). > > > > It does not follow that the user must be required to select keys. A > well-designed application would present the user with a choice of > identities, and do key selection based on that. > > I guess the UI for selecting keys is an altogether different topic. Yes, (as > was also suggested by Anders Rundgren recently), the UI for selecting > keys/identities should be different from the current nerdy interface. Thus, > a user may not realize they are selecting a 'key' (nerdy term), they might > just be presented with 'identities' that are tied to a key. Just as a point of reference - such selection *MUST* be user agent controlled, because it's about making a security decision. Exposing the keys to the web application, in order to allow the web application to present an interface that the user then selects which keys to authorize for the web application, is a fundamentally flawed and inherently insecure operation. > > > > Ø Whether a key is acceptable or not may not be possible to do on the > client side, so the client-side app will have to communicate all key details > to the back-end to determine which key is what it is looking for. Having an > attribute on the key could help the application make choices on the > client-side. Of course, as repeated so many times, this does not mean that > the server does not do its own validations on the key – it still has to do > those validations. The reason people do client-side validation of forms in > JS is because of expediency – does not mean that server does not do those > same checks. > > > > I think we all agree with this statement. However, it seems that you’re > using it to justify client-side checks that, almost by definition, cannot be > repeated on the server. A server cannot possibly check what provider a key > is stored in; it’s going to do cryptographic checks like looking for a > certificate. Why not have the app do the same check on the client as well? > > Again, I agree with you. Yes, the same logic that the server uses can be > used on the client side. It is just burdensome. The server will have to > expose its different trust anchors to the client and client will have to > iterate through each of them for each key. Again going back to form > validations done in JS, note that JS validations are not the only > validations the server does, the server could do many more validations. All > of them are not implemented on the client-side. > I guess the question is the relative merits of exposing this attribute vs > having the client implement trust-anchor logic. Originally, we were talking in terms of discovery/authorization. Such UI is necessarily *only* in the user agent, and cannot be (securely) exposed to arbitrary web applications. So when we say "the client well have to iterate through each of them for each key", I think it should be clarified that we're talking about the client being "the user agent" *not* "the web application"
Received on Friday, 7 September 2012 18:56:02 UTC