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Re: [webauthn] The risk of attacker may can identify whether if the account support FIDO or not (#1475)

From: Emil Lundberg via GitHub <sysbot+gh@w3.org>
Date: Tue, 01 Sep 2020 14:14:51 +0000
To: public-webauthn@w3.org
Message-ID: <issue_comment.created-684886512-1598969690-sysbot+gh@w3.org>
This is similar to what's described in [14.6.3. Privacy leak via credential IDs](https://w3c.github.io/webauthn/#sctn-credential-id-privacy-leak), and the same countermeasures should apply here. Perhaps we should make a mention of this in the security considerations section, too, but it doesn't look like anything substantive needs to be added.

I don't agree that this also applies to the discoverable keys (username-less) use case, as the server then returns only a challenge to initiate the ceremony. If the server only supports username-less authentication, I don't see how this issue can occur. It remains if the server supports both discoverable and non-discoverable keys, though.

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