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Re: Isolate-Me explainer

From: Tanvi Vyas <tanvi@mozilla.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2016 15:11:33 -0700
To: "Emily Stark (Dunn)" <estark@google.com>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>
Cc: Mike West <mkwst@google.com>, Joel Weinberger <jww@google.com>
Message-ID: <46d8c549-5f1b-540a-998c-63381ef14827@mozilla.com>
This is great!  Thank you for putting it together!  I have added some 
comments on individual sections below.
**Section 2, Example 2 and 3*
You make a good point about window.opener!  In the Containers feature, 
we check to ensure that the referrer is stripped when opening a link in 
a different type of container, but I'm not sure we disable the 
window.opener() and open() references.  I'll check that out and be sure 
to fix it if we don't.
**Section 2, Example 6* (and Section 4, Policy 2)
If a website says "isolate-me", is the website essentially also setting 
the X-Frame-Options to SameOrigin?  In the Containers model (and in 
Tor's First Party Isolation), there are no framing restrictions.

For example, if foo.com told the browser to "isolate-me", any top level 
requests made to foo.com would be isolated with their own cookie jar.  
If foo.com was framed by bar.com, then framed foo.com wouldn't have 
access to the same set of cookies they would have had as a top level 
request.  Instead, they would start with a fresh cookie jar, that could 
then be populated.

The above method reduces breakage; perhaps foo.com has unauthenticated 
content that they want framed.  On the other hand, if framed content did 
have access to a fresh cookie jar, the user could end up logging into 
foo.com via the iframe and then exposing themselves, despite foo.com's 
attempt to request isolation.  So another option would be to allow 
framed content, but not give that content access to any cookie jars 
(i.e. sandboxed frames).

What about other types of subresources - ex: non-same origin image or 
script loads from the isolated domain?

*Section 3, Protection 1*
It is difficult to prevent XSS via navigations without restricting 
navigations.  Artur brought this up to the Containers team as well; if 
the browser isolates bank.com, a user could still click on a maliciously 
crafted bank.com link that could send their data to an attacker.  Hence, 
I understand the reason to restrict navigations. But in practice, this 
may prompt the user to just copy/paste the link into the url bar.  If 
they see a link to an interesting article on isolated news.com, they 
don't want to visit news.com and then search for that article, they want 
to get to the article immediately.  So if clicking the link doesn't 
work, they are likely to just copy/paste it.  So I wonder if restricting 
navigations is really going to prevent XSS, or just act as an 
unnecessary hurdle for users to jump through.  Perhaps we could 
brainstorm to see if there are other alternatives.

*Section 3, Protection 5* (and Section 4, policy 4)
Consider this scenario:
Top level - a.com
Frame[0] - b.com
Frame[1] - c.com
Frame[1][0] - c.com creates a grandchild frame to b.com

Should Frame[0] and Frame[1][0] share cookies?  Or each have their own 
isolated cookies?  In the Containers approach, they would share 
cookies.  In Tor's First Party Isolation approach, they would have 
separate cookies.
**Section 4, Policy 1*
If isolation is done properly, is SameSite a given?  Is SameSite 
included as a policy here just to be explicit, or does SameSite provide 
some additional benefits over the isolation described?
**Section 4, Policy 3*
What is this policy aiming to protect?  Is it trying to prevent a third 
party from navigating the top level page, or something else?

*Section 4, Policy 6*
What if the new window is same origin?  Should two isolated windows from 
the same domain have access to each other?  Perhaps this should say:
"When the isolated origin opens a new window to a different origin, 
disown/neueter the opened page’s window.opener."
**Section 4, Policy 8*
How could this happen?  Is this section meant to handle the 
foo.example.com and bar.example.com case, where one is isolated and 
another is not?

As part of our work on Containers, we've had a lot of questions come up 
about what should and shouldn't be isolated.  We try to weigh the 
benefits and risks when making these decisions, and have changed our 
minds a number of times.  We should be specific about what isolate-me 
isolates i) always, ii) never, iii) at the discretion of the user 
agent.  Examples below.  (Note that if framing and subresource loads 
from the isolated site are disabled, as proposed, some of these are not 
OCSP Responses
Security Exceptions (ex: cert overrides)
Passwords saved by the Password Manager
User Certificates
Saved Form Data



On 9/16/16 8:15 AM, Emily Stark (Dunn) wrote:
> Hi webappsec! Mike, Joel, and I have been discussing an idea for a 
> developer facing opt-in to allow highly security- or privacy-sensitive 
> sites to be isolated from other origins on the web.
> We wrote up the idea here to explain what we're thinking about, why we 
> think it's important, and the major open questions: 
> https://mikewest.github.io/isolation/explainer.html
> Please read and comment/criticize/etc. Thoughts welcome, either here 
> in this thread or as GitHub issues. Especially interested to hear from 
> Mozilla folks as it relates to and is heavily inspired by containers.
> Thanks!
> Emily
Received on Monday, 19 September 2016 22:12:14 UTC

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