- From: Devdatta Akhawe <dev.akhawe@gmail.com>
- Date: Mon, 12 Sep 2016 08:45:02 -0700
- To: Sergey Shekyan <shekyan@gmail.com>
- Cc: Frederik Braun <fbraun@mozilla.com>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAPfop_3HvstdqD_FWenJ9AjW57scSFQF5LqDU7sqCn2Z7P1NZg@mail.gmail.com>
I also agree with Sergey. On 12 September 2016 at 00:01, Sergey Shekyan <shekyan@gmail.com> wrote: > On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 12:19 AM, Frederik Braun <fbraun@mozilla.com> > wrote: > >> Hi list, >> >> the SRI editor's draft defines an experimental CSP directive >> "require-sri-for" that is followed by tokens (script or style)[1] to >> mandate that the web page requires integrity metadata or for those >> loads. It was added in this pull request[2] >> >> Firefox has an experimental implementation, which lead to some good >> feedback. For example, we've had a bug report that suggests we should >> block importScript(), since there is no way to supply integrity metadata >> with importScript(). >> >> This inadvertedly leads to follow-up questions: >> 1) What should require-sri-for do for other methods that do not allow >> fetch-options (e.g. @import and url() in CSS)? > > >> 2) What should require-sri-for do for same-origin resources (Workers, >> importScripts etc. can not load cross-origin)? > > >> >> My thoughts so far: >> >> re 1) I don't think there's anything we can do besides blocking, if we >> want require-sri-for to be a security feature that websites rely on. >> > > In `require-sri-for` implementation in Chrome [1], the goal was to require > integrity > metadata for all possible mechanisms of loading scripts and styles, > including preloads and prefetches. > > Most of those mechanisms do not provide a way to specify integrity > metadata today, and the hope is > that eventually those ways will be covered in the next iteration of SRI > spec. I would expect that when new > mechanism to load resources is invented, browsers will ship it with a way > to provide integrity metadata. > > >> re 2) I've been thinking about this myself and would consider allowing >> same-origin loads without integrity metadata. It just does not fit the >> use case of not having to trust a CDN. >> > > I agree with others that same-origin resources should not be treated > differently from cross-origin > ones. > [1] https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5635811978510336 > >> >> >> >> Looking forward to hearing your input! >> Freddy >> >> >> >> [1] I am thinking about changing the syntax, see other email. >> [2] >> https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-subresource-integrity/pull/ >> 32#issuecomment >> >> >
Received on Monday, 12 September 2016 15:45:56 UTC