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Re: CSP reports: `script-sample`

From: Devdatta Akhawe <dev.akhawe@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2016 10:15:14 -0700
Message-ID: <CAPfop_34wrzFWNFqmzsP5DcNeJ1PC9ETXaL+0jNYb=Boq7qE4A@mail.gmail.com>
To: Mike West <mkwst@google.com>
Cc: "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>, Artur Janc <aaj@google.com>, Christoph Kerschbaumer <ckerschbaumer@mozilla.com>, Frederik Braun <fbraun@mozilla.com>, Scott Helme <scotthelme@hotmail.com>, Lukas Weichselbaum <lwe@google.com>, Michele Spagnuolo <mikispag@google.com>, Jochen Eisinger <eisinger@google.com>
Hey

In the case of a third-party script having an error, what are example leaks
you are worried about?

cheers
Dev



On 17 October 2016 at 07:37, Mike West <mkwst@google.com> wrote:

> +Lukas, Miki, and Jochen, who I intended to add but didn't.
>
> -mike
>
> On Mon, Oct 17, 2016 at 4:15 PM, Mike West <mkwst@google.com> wrote:
>
>> Hello, webappsec!
>>
>> Last week, Artur, Christoph, Freddy, and I had a conversation about
>> reporting more detail for script-based violations. In particular, Artur and
>> his team at Google would love for Firefox's `script-sample` report field to
>> be implemented in Chrome (and extended in Firefox) to help them diagnose
>> inline event handlers, scripts, etc. The conversation was a bit
>> contentious, so bringing it to the list might be interesting, as I expect
>> folks to have opinions. I have a few myself.
>>
>> I think there was general agreement on two points:
>>
>> 1. It's totally reasonable to provide developers with more information
>> about violations on their own pages. They can already crawl the DOM via
>> JavaScript, so the data contained in `<script>` and inline `onX` handlers
>> is something they could potentially hack their way to reporting via
>> 'SecurityPolicyViolation' events (by reporting everything on the page, if
>> nothing else).
>>
>> 2. It's not reasonable to provide developers with details of third-party
>> script, unless that external script has opted into sharing details via
>> CORS. Though Firefox correctly sanitizes script errors per spec, it doesn't
>> appear to sanitize `script-sample`; that continues to worry me.
>>
>> There was less agreement on this third point:
>>
>> 3. I'm worried about sending the contents of inline script blocks to a
>> third-party, as those blocks seem to me to be the most likely to contain
>> sensitive information (`var email = 'mike@mikewest.org';`, `var ssn =
>> '123-45-6789';`, etc). I'm worried about this for two reasons: a) it might
>> enable abuse, especially in the context of embedded enforcement, and b)
>> reports seem by their nature to be delivered to logging servers which
>> probably don't have the same kinds of data retention policies (or
>> understanding of data sensitivity) as other systems.
>>
>> Artur, and others, suggested that this isn't much of a concern because a)
>> the data is already available to script, and b) any sensitivity is
>> mitigated by manipulating the data somehow (stripping to ~40 characters
>> like Firefox does, stripping constants, etc.).
>>
>> With those in mind, I'm thinking:
>>
>> 1. Firefox should reexamine it's behavior for cross-origin script
>> (perhaps it already has?).
>>
>> 2. Inline event handlers are probably fine to report; they're unlikely to
>> contain sensitive data, are already available to JavaScript that crawls the
>> DOM, etc.
>>
>> 3. Inline scripts worry me, but maybe they shouldn't worry me as much as
>> they do. It's not clear to me what kind of metric we could use to make a
>> real decision here, but anecdata from Google's deployment shows that the
>> `script-sample` data gathered from Firefox hasn't been sensitive. It's
>> unclear how well that applies to the rest of the web (or, indeed, to
>> Google's sites that aren't yet using CSP). Perhaps Mozilla folks did some
>> research when implementing this feature that justify/explain the 40
>> character limit as sufficiently-safe?
>>
>> What do y'all think?
>>
>> -mike
>>
>
>
Received on Monday, 17 October 2016 17:16:02 UTC

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