W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-webappsec@w3.org > February 2016

Re: Using client certificates for signing

From: Henry Story <henry.story@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 2016 16:01:58 +0000
Cc: "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>
Message-Id: <E1E15717-CAC1-4569-BE8B-F4874D26B428@gmail.com>
To: noloader@gmail.com

> On 23 Feb 2016, at 10:34, Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>> Microsoft are also behind the W3C TAG (Techncial Architecture Group) finding
>> on client certificates
>> 
>>  http://w3ctag.github.io/client-certificates/
>> 
>> I'd suggest reading that for guidance rather than the rumour mill.
> 
> Well, its kind of disingenuous that companies who make browsers are
> against it and they present their claims. The security model and
> threat models used for the web are broken. They are simply not
> realistic, and they represent some netherland that does not exist for
> most users.
> 
> "Interception is a valid use case" is ghastly, including the
> abomination known as Public Key Pinning with Overrides. Claiming
> authority for it in the W3C's Priority of Constituencies is tenuous at
> best. Even the IETF is embarrassed by that standard.
> 
> The browser's inability to work with client certificates is one of the
> reasons the browser is delegated to low value data only. And not
> surprisingly, the same companies building the browsers tell you its OK
> to handle high value data, and store the data in their clouds. Its
> like trying to ask a drunk if he is drunk, and trying to get a
> straight answer...
> 
> Client Certificates have long been the way we have combatted the
> chronic mishandling of secrets perpetuated by browsers.

I am of course a big proponent of TLS, client-certs and keygen.
https://www.w3.org/2005/Incubator/webid/spec/tls/

That does not mean that I think the current technology is perfect
of course, but on the web one should not ask for perfection,
but instead for continuous improvement.

• CA's are known to be broken because of the least common denominator problem
Browsers chould implement IETF DANE to improve that
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6698

• X509 Certificates are old fragile technology.
Hopefully the Verifiable Claims task force will
come up with a much more webby way of doing that
http://opencreds.org/specs/source/use-cases/

• WWW-Authenticate: with password is bad
TLS authentication could be moved to the http layer
with HTTP-Signature. I have implemented this and it works
https://github.com/solid/solid-spec/issues/52


Henry

> 
> Jeff
Received on Tuesday, 23 February 2016 16:02:25 UTC

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