W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-webappsec@w3.org > July 2015

Re: CSP2: Drop 'unsafe-redirect'.

From: Mike West <mkwst@google.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2015 11:54:34 +0200
Message-ID: <CAKXHy=euZgg8kO-QozzBxr2wyN77oGBbN7YTe-K9uWCVDnRi3A@mail.gmail.com>
To: Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org>
Cc: "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>, Wendy Seltzer <wseltzer@w3.org>, Brad Hill <hillbrad@gmail.com>, Dan Veditz <dveditz@mozilla.com>
On Thu, Jul 2, 2015 at 7:26 PM, Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org> wrote:

> My overall point is that this kind of compatibility issue is very
> short-term pain that is easily addressed. We should be careful to dismiss
> things that are useful in the long-term because of these short-term issues.
> And the breaking of any website or product of a webappsec member (at least)
> due to it using a feature before a specification reaches Recommendation
> status shouldn't be considered to be problematic; instead it should be
> expected, especially when the breaking behavior is *already actually in the
> spec* but just not implemented. Everybody should expect to have to make
> changes on short notice at least until a spec reaches Recommendation
> status. If that doesn't work for them, then they should wait until the spec
> reaches Recommendation status to use the features. W3C can't have an
> effective spec development process otherwise.

Since it probably wasn't clear from my response, I do agree with this
broader point. In particular, I'd note that both Firefox and Chrome have
pushed ahead with a somewhat late change to the meaning of `'self'` with
regard to `blob:` in CSP2. When there is a real reason to make a change, we
can and should ask developers to accept these behavioral changes.

As you note below, `'unsafe-redirect'` was a bad mechanism that should have
had more review before I put it into the spec. If it had real security
impact, it would be worth impacting those 0.7% of page views (or 7%. Or
70%. On some reasonable timescale. :) ).

In the last hunk of your patch, you removed the text about redirects being
> something to watch out for. I think that is OK because the surprising (to
> some) behavior of redirects in CSP is called out in section
> already. If it is not too late, I recommend also recommending in section
> that the server pay attention of the CSP request header to avoid
> the attack.

We're going to have to go through CR again (I plan on sending out a CfC
tomorrow), so editorial changes are totally reasonable to add! Last minute
requests, anyone else? :)

Received on Monday, 6 July 2015 09:55:22 UTC

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